

Transnational Ties and Support for Foreign Aid

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Abstract

Although globalization and international migration have increased personal connections across national borders, we know little about how these connections affect attitudes towards foreign policy. This study examines how transnational ties affect support for foreign aid in donor countries. It argues that transnational ties increase support for foreign aid via two mechanisms: group interests and cosmopolitanism. An original survey experiment embedded in a national survey of 1,000 Latino Americans shows that Latinos vary significantly in the strength of their transnational ties, which is strongly correlated with support for foreign aid. The findings from the experiment, which varies the location of an American foreign aid program, demonstrate that although group interests explain some of this effect, cosmopolitanism is also an important mechanism. Indeed, Latinos with transnational ties equally support aid to Africa and Latin America. A test of the generalizability of the findings to other racial and ethnic groups in the United States and United Kingdom reveal that group interests may be a more powerful mechanism outside of the Latino American community. This study encourages further work on the relationship between transnational ties and foreign policy attitudes and provides insight into the emerging link between international migration and foreign aid.

Word Count: 11,060

In Nye and Keohane's collection on transnational politics, scholars identify a range of institutions through which individuals can maintain relationships across national borders such as multinational corporations, religious organizations, and activist groups.¹ More recently, as countries and people have become more connected through transnational processes such as globalization and international migration, researchers have started thinking about the relationships that exist outside of these institutional structures such as those in transnational social networks. Individuals in transnational social networks maintain these connections abroad through a variety of transnational practices. These practices are made easier with the ease of modern communication and international travel.² Today, someone who was born abroad or who has friends or family living abroad can connect with others in their transnational social networks fairly easily and at a relatively low cost just by picking up the phone or clicking a button.

What are the effects of transnational ties on individual support for foreign policy? In this article, I examine the role of transnational ties in shaping support for foreign aid in donor countries. I develop a theory that argues that transnational ties raise support for foreign aid via two possible mechanisms. The first mechanism is group interests. Prior research in international relations suggests that group attachments shape foreign policy preferences, such as those towards war (e.g. Berinsky (2009)) and even private forms of foreign assistance.³ Furthermore, the literature on group interests and the welfare state suggests that group ties are a powerful determinant of support for redistribution in the *domestic* context (e.g. Alesina and Glaeser (2004)). Thus, I hypothesize that transnational ties between individuals in a cross-border community may raise support for international redistribution in the form

¹Nye 1971

²Levitt 2001

³Desai and Kharas 2018

of foreign aid policy towards that community, but not more broadly.

Beyond group interests, I argue that an additional mechanism – the cosmopolitan mechanism – may also lead individuals with transnational ties to have greater support for foreign aid. Drawing on the transnationalism and cosmopolitanism literatures, I hypothesize that transnational ties may be associated with a cosmopolitan worldview – having worldly interests over parochial ones. Past research has found a relationship between transnational practices and cosmopolitanism⁴, and cosmopolitanism has been linked with support for international redistribution.⁵ Contrary to the group interests mechanism, the cosmopolitan mechanism predicts that transnational ties are associated with broader support for foreign aid driven by beliefs about moral obligations to humanity more broadly, rather than by loyalties to a specific cross-border community.

To test this theory and its generalizability, I fielded three original surveys with embedded experiments in the United States and the United Kingdom. This article focuses first on identifying the effects of transnational ties on the foreign aid attitudes of the Latino American community. Latinos are one of the largest diaspora communities from the developing world living in a single, developed country. Moreover, Latinos are an increasingly important constituency in American politics with influence on the future direction of U.S. foreign policy. While research in American politics has advanced our understanding of the domestic policy preferences of Latinos, this is one of the first studies to investigate Latino attitudes about foreign policy.

The primary source of data in this study is a national survey of 1,000 Latinos fielded in August 2013 that contains original measures of respondents' foreign attachments and a novel embedded experiment designed to test the group interests mechanism and the cosmopolitan mechanism. I find that Latino respondents with transnational ties are significantly more

⁴Mau, Mewes, and Zimmerman 2008

⁵Bechtel, Hainmueller, and Margalit 2014

supportive of U.S. foreign aid than respondents without ties. I explore the group interests and cosmopolitanism hypotheses using an experiment which randomly varies the location of the aid program. The design encourages respondents to think that a U.S. foreign aid program is located either in Africa or Latin America and a picture showing recipients of the program reinforces this message. The findings provide evidence for both the group interests and cosmopolitan mechanisms: Latinos with transnational ties display high levels of support for *both* the program in Africa and the program in Latin America. Moreover, Latinos with transnational ties also feel strongly that the U.S. government is morally obligated to help both the Latin American aid recipients and the African aid recipients. I examine the generalizability of these findings to other racial and ethnic groups using original surveys fielded in the United States and United Kingdom to diverse national samples that include respondents from a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds.

This study contributes to a rich literature in international relations on international migration, diaspora politics, and foreign policy. Scholars have found that ties between domestic and foreign members of a diaspora group can affect a number of foreign policy outcomes of interest.⁶ These outcomes range from international security outcomes⁷ such as peace and conflict⁸ to international economic outcomes such as trade⁹, investment¹⁰, exchange rates¹¹, economic sanctions¹², and foreign aid¹³. An important way in which scholars suggest diaspora groups can affect foreign policy outcomes is through the mobilization of diaspora group members for policies that benefit their home countries.¹⁴

Yet, the foreign policy preferences of individual members of these communities remain

⁶Shain and Barth 2003

⁷Rudolph 2003

⁸Smith 2007

⁹Casella 2002, Greif 1989, Greif 1993, Rauch 2002

¹⁰Leblang 2010

¹¹Singer 2010

¹²Rubenzler and Redd 2010

¹³Bermeo and Leblang 2015

¹⁴Shain 1994

relatively understudied or are simply assumed or inferred from foreign policy outcomes. Problematically, these studies tend to assume diaspora members care exclusively about members of their cross-border community. This study interrogates that assumption theorizing about additional mechanisms and policy attitudes beyond the typical group interests theory. It therefore helps establish the microfoundations for these findings and demonstrates that group attachments are not the only mechanism driving the connection between diasporas and foreign policy outcomes. Finally, studies that examine the effects of international migration on foreign policy outcomes do so typically by focusing on host and home country dyads. If transnational ties are associated with cosmopolitanism, as some of the findings in this article imply, this suggests that international migration could have effects beyond the dyad.

A Model of Transnational Ties and Foreign Aid Attitudes

Although the emerging literature on migration and foreign aid has made progress documenting the relationship between the two at the country level¹⁵, this article focuses on the individual level, specifying the microfoundations linking migration and foreign aid. Specifically, I first identify a source of variation in diaspora communities: the strength of their ties with their home countries and regions. Then, I outline the mechanisms linking the strength of transnational ties to support for foreign aid.

First, what are transnational ties and why are they important? By transnational ties, I refer to the personal connections individuals have to foreign countries and regions. One of the primary ways in which individuals in donor countries have ties to foreign countries and regions in the developing world is through international migration. According to United Nations Population Facts, “From 1990 to 2013, the number of international migrants born in the South and residing in the North doubled, increasing from 40 to 82 million and growing

¹⁵Bermeo and Leblang 2015, Gamsso and Yuldashev 2018

more than twice as fast as the global total [of migrants].” Thus, the number of individuals residing in foreign aid donor countries from potential recipient countries is substantial and growing.

Moreover, many of the individuals moving from South to North engage in international redistribution themselves. Indeed, according to the World Bank, the money sent from international migrants to developing countries is expected to rise to \$516 billion dollars in 2016, far outpacing official development assistance provided by foreign aid donors.¹⁶ If many of the individuals in donor countries with transnational ties are already engaging in international redistribution themselves, then it may follow that they are also an important constituency in favor of government foreign aid policies.

Below I hypothesize two causal pathways that would lead individuals with transnational ties to have greater support for foreign aid than individuals without ties. The first pathway aligns with conventional assumptions in the literature about diaspora members. The assumption is that individuals with transnational ties will be more likely to identify with a cross-border community than those without ties and identifying with this community will increase support for foreign aid to that community, but not more broadly. I argue however, that there is a second pathway, which draws on the positive relationship between transnational ties and cosmopolitanism, a predisposition that scholars have also found to be a good predictor of support for foreign aid.¹⁷ I suggest that the cosmopolitan pathway leads to a different observable implication as cosmopolitanism should increase support for foreign aid more broadly, beyond the individual’s transnational community. I take each of these pathways in turn.

¹⁶World Bank Press Release, April 11, 2014 - “*Remittances to developing countries to stay robust this year, despite increased deportations of migrant workers, says WB*”

¹⁷Bechtel, Hainmueller, Margalit 2014

Transnational Ties and Group Interests

Group interests are a long standing factor thought to shape support for redistribution in the domestic context, yet this factor has until recently been almost completely ignored by the literature on attitudes towards *international* redistribution. Instead, the literature on foreign aid attitudes has focused almost exclusively on self-interest¹⁸ and values, such as cosmopolitanism¹⁹, ideology²⁰, morality²¹, and religiosity²². To my knowledge only two studies of international redistribution have considered the influence of cross-border group interests on foreign aid outcomes and attitudes.

First, Bermeo and Leblang (2015) examine how international migration affects foreign aid outcomes. Their study finds a positive association between the number of migrants in donor country B from recipient country A and foreign aid from donor country B to recipient country A. They argue that group interests are one of two important mechanisms leading to this result.²³ In their theory, diaspora group members mobilize in favor of foreign aid to support those in their cross-border community. They argue that migrant voting rights in donor countries should therefore augment the positive relationship between the size of a migrant population and foreign aid towards that population's home country. Their analysis provides some support for this hypothesis. While their work rests on the assumption that individual members of a migrant population support foreign aid directed at their home country, they do not test it. Although one could infer this from their analysis, explicitly testing the validity of this assumption, as I do in this study, provides more evidence in favor of a mobilization mechanism and contributes overall to our understanding of why some

¹⁸Milner and Tingley 2010, Milner and Tingley 2011, Paxton and Knack 2012

¹⁹Bechtel, Hainmueller, Margalit 2014

²⁰Noel and Therien 2000

²¹van Heerde and Hudson 2010

²²Paxton and Knack 2012

²³The other mechanism is donor country interests to prevent additional migration from recipient country A. They find support for this mechanism as well.

countries receive more foreign aid than others.²⁴

Second, the only research to investigate the effect of social groups on the formation of individual preferences about international redistribution is a study by Baker (2015). He examines the role of racial prejudice and racial paternalism in structuring individual support for foreign aid. His research shows that group interests do not structure White American attitudes towards foreign aid as respondents support aid to a Black-majority country over aid to a White-majority country. Instead of group interests, respondents' attitudes appear to be driven in part by paternalistic impulses motivated by stereotypes of Black foreigners. Despite the mixed findings on the effects of group interests suggested by these two studies, my work takes an important first step in investigating the potential importance of social groups for explaining outcomes and attitudes related to international redistribution.

While there may be a dearth of research on group interests and international redistribution, the literature on group interests and domestic redistribution is vast. It offers numerous studies that demonstrate that group interests can affect redistributive behaviors and outcomes. Experimentally, researchers have shown that individuals are more trusting of and more generous to in-group members. This finding holds for members of ethnic and racial groups for example, as well as when group membership is artificially simulated in a lab setting.²⁵ Looking at outcomes, a number of studies have demonstrated that the presence of diverse social groups in a society contributes to lower levels of prosocial activities and policies. For example, in a well-known study on this topic, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) examine differences in welfare state size across developed countries. They argue that differences in the size of the welfare state between the United States and Europe are due in part to the

²⁴Moreover, when looking at their results by donor country, Bermeo and Leblang find that the relationship between the size of a migrant population and foreign aid does not hold for the United States. They argue that the reason for this exception is due to the strategic focus of American aid policy. My study suggests an alternative explanation: Variation in the strength of transnational ties within the Latino population could affect the willingness of a considerable part of that population to mobilize on behalf of their homeland.

²⁵Tajfel 1970, Kramer 1984, Brewer 1985, Gilens 1999, Habyarimana, et al. 2009, Wong 2010

historic diversity of the American population and the homogeneity of European countries. Thus, there is a great deal of evidence that group interests are an important source of incentives for individuals when engaging in redistributive behaviors, but it is unclear the extent to which they structure such behaviors in the international context.

There is reason to believe that group interests might. Scholars have shown that group membership can structure support for other foreign policies such as war and economic sanctions against other countries.²⁶ Indeed, although Converse (1964) in his seminal work on the nature of mass opinion was pessimistic about the ability of individuals to make reasoned political decisions, he suggested one way publics might do so is by using social groups as reference points. Building on these insights and the literature on domestic redistribution, I argue that individuals with transnational ties have a cross-border community to use as a reference point when thinking about foreign aid policies. Moreover, they may have a sense of obligation towards the country or region where they have attachments. This feeling of obligation may drive individuals with transnational ties to support redistributive policies that benefit others in these communities.²⁷ An implication of this theory then is that transnational ties will increase support for international redistribution but only for foreign aid programs that target foreign community members.

Transnational Ties and Cosmopolitanism

As noted above, the literature on diaspora politics focuses narrowly on diaspora community members' attitudes and behaviors related to policies towards their home countries. This focus has obscured the possibility of a broader range of preferences members of these communities may have. Thus, I propose an additional mechanism linking transnational ties to support for foreign aid. I argue that individuals with transnational ties may be supportive of foreign redistribution regardless of the country receiving aid as transnational ties have been linked

²⁶Berinsky 2009

²⁷Wong 2010

to a more cosmopolitan worldview.

Political philosophers characterize cosmopolitanism as a subjective identity in which individuals view themselves as world citizens more than members of a particular group. Other scholars have proposed a less stringent definition of a cosmopolitan worldview in which cosmopolitan individuals are defined as simply having worldly interests. An essay by Jackman and Vavreck (2011) on cosmopolitanism provides a definition drawn from the work of Robert Merton.²⁸ Cosmopolitans, they suggest, are individuals who are “more attentive to the world than ‘locals’ who tend to be oriented toward the local community.”²⁹ They show that individuals with worldly concern have distinct political preferences over candidates and domestic policies from those with more parochial interests. Importantly, while there is little work linking cosmopolitanism to foreign aid, Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit (2014) demonstrate that cosmopolitanism is one of the key predictors of support for international bailouts in Germany—a form of foreign aid. They define cosmopolitanism similarly and use a measure of cosmopolitanism that builds on Merton’s definition.

Although neither cosmopolitanism (as described above) nor transnationalism have distinct and universally accepted definitions or measures,³⁰ there are compelling reasons to believe that transnational practices like those associated with international migration and maintaining transnational ties can result in a cosmopolitan worldview. Jackman and Vavreck (2011) note that “[t]here is a widely shared scholarly consensus that cosmopolitanism is largely driven by experience.”³¹ In particular, they argue that cosmopolitanism is a byproduct of transnational practices like international travel and communication which lead individuals to interact with others who may be different from themselves. Thus, while it has been assumed in the literature on diaspora politics that individuals with transnational ties are

²⁸Merton 1957

²⁹Jackman and Vavreck 2011, 71

³⁰Roudometof 2005

³¹Jackman and Vavreck 2011, 72

primarily oriented towards their homelands, transnational experiences may actually foster an interest in and an understanding of a broader, more global, range of issues.³²

Of particular relevance to this study, Pachon and de la Garza (2000) show that when Latino leaders are asked about their interest in world regions, around half say they are more interested in Latin America, while the other half say they are more interested in other regions or are equally interested in Latin America and other regions. The statistics are not broken down by the strength of these leaders' ties with their home countries, but the fact that nearly half of Latino leaders in that study expressed equivalent or greater interests in other regions of the world suggests the possibility that diaspora group members may have a more cosmopolitan worldview than previously assumed. Moreover, Helbling and Teney (2015) argue that the effects of transnational activities on cosmopolitan attitudes are potentially even stronger among the masses than among the elite.

If this argument is correct, then we might expect individuals with transnational ties to have a more cosmopolitan worldview. A cosmopolitan's greater attention to the world and greater empathy towards people of diverse cultures may lead them to develop beliefs about obligations to the foreign poor *regardless* of their location. Therefore, individuals with transnational ties may be supportive of foreign aid more broadly, rather than supporting only those programs that benefit countries or regions where they have personal connections.

Data and Hypotheses

To investigate the relationship between transnational ties and support for international redistribution, I use individual-level data from a survey fielded in the United States to a national sample of 1,000 Latino respondents. The Latino community in the United States is an important population to study for this research question for three key reasons. First, the Latino American community is growing and the Latino electorate is becoming more

³²Mau, Mewes, and Zimmerman 2008

influential. Understanding Latino attitudes on foreign policy, which have been relatively understudied to this date, provides insight into the future direction of U.S. foreign policy. Second, Latinos represent a community with important variation in transnational ties and scholars have argued that this variation is key to understanding the determinants of Latino transnational political behavior and attitudes.³³ Finally, while the theory laid out above regarding the relationship between transnational ties and support for international redistribution is rather general, it is likely that it applies most to individuals living in foreign aid donor countries with transnational ties to the developing world. Thus, the Latino American community represents an ideal population with which to begin exploring this relationship.

I use a survey fielded in August 2013 to an online sample of 1,000 Latino American respondents. The survey was administered in English using YouGov's online survey platform. It contained a number of questions measuring both demographic characteristics of the respondents and political attitudes. The questions were fielded as a part of the omnibus instrument of the Laboratory for the Study of American Values at Stanford University.

Measuring Transnational Ties

The main independent variable in this study – transnational ties – distinguishes between three mutually exclusive levels of transnational ties using three different measures. These measures are binary indicators for whether or not a respondent was born abroad, sends remittances abroad or has close friends and family abroad. I code a respondent as having no transnational ties if they meet the following three conditions: 1) they were born in the United States; 2) they do not send remittances; 3) they do not have any close friends or family living abroad.³⁴ Thirty-nine percent of the Latinos in my sample have no transnational ties.

Among respondents with some transnational ties, I differentiate between those with

³³Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003

³⁴Although respondents who said they do not have any close friends or family abroad were still allowed to answer the question about remittance behavior, only one percent of respondents said they sent money abroad when they did not respond affirmatively to the friends or family question.




Figure 1: **Coding Transnational Ties**

stronger, more costly ties and those with weaker ties. I code a respondent as having strong transnational ties (about thirty-five percent of the sample) if they meet either of the following conditions: 1) they were born in a foreign country (first generation immigrant) or 2) they send remittances. First generation immigrants are the most likely of any generational group in my sample to have strong connections abroad. More than eighty percent of the first generation immigrants report having close friends or family abroad and half say they send money abroad to help them. Remittances, however, are a costly form of transnational ties for individuals regardless of generational status (and are themselves a form of private international redistribution). Therefore, respondents who send remittances abroad, but are

beyond first generation immigrants are also coded as having strong ties. Finally, I code a respondent as having weak transnational ties if they meet the following three conditions: 1) they were born in the United States; 2) they do not send remittances; 3) they have close friends or family living abroad. This category of respondents represents twenty-six percent of my sample. Figure 1 depicts these coding decisions graphically.

I validate my measure of transnational ties using the self-reported Spanish speaking ability of respondents – a trait we would also expect to be associated with the strength of transnational ties. I find a significant, nearly monotonic, twenty-four percentage point increase across each level of ties in the percentage of respondents reporting that they speak Spanish well. Forty-one percent of respondents with no ties claim to speak Spanish well. Sixty-four percent of respondents with weak ties say they speak Spanish well. Respondents in the strong ties category are the most proficient Spanish speakers with eighty-eight percent noting their high level of Spanish-speaking ability.

The Supporting Information (SI) includes figures demonstrating the robustness of the key findings to alternative coding rules for the *Ties* measure as well as using Spanish speaking ability as a proxy for transnational ties.³⁵ The results are robust to these alternatives.

Experimental Design

To examine how transnational ties affect support for international redistribution, I construct an experiment that is embedded in the survey. In the experiment, respondents read a fictional news article about a U.S. government program that they are told U.S. officials might cut. The news article contains two independently randomized treatments for a 2x2 factorial design. The first treatment (*Foreign*) varies whether the government program is a foreign assistance

³⁵The alternative coding scheme tested for robustness is a simple additive measure with four levels of ties. The maximum value of this alternative is 3 (being born abroad, sending remittances, *and* having friends and family abroad) and the minimum value is 0 corresponding to having none of these attributes. Values coded as 2 and 1 correspond to individuals that have any two of the traits or any one of the traits respectively. Individuals who receive a coding of 1 in this scheme primarily report having friends and family abroad but do not send remittances and were not born abroad.

program or a domestic assistance program. I use a second treatment (*Latino*) to test the mechanisms. The *Latino* treatment varies the location of the recipients of the aid program. In the news article, the location of the aid program is described as either targeting countries in Africa or countries in Latin America and a picture associated with the news article reinforces this treatment. Figures 2 and 3 hold the experimental vignette and a screenshot from the YouGov survey platform.

U.S. Officials May Cut Hunger Relief Program

Program Gives Food To The Poor In [**The United States** / **Other Countries**]

WASHINGTON, D.C. –U.S. government officials are considering cutting a government hunger relief program. It assists 150,000 people living below the poverty line in [**the United States** / **other countries**]. Through the program, the U.S. government distributes food packages to program recipients. It costs the U.S. government \$100 million each year. Officials hope to reach a decision about the program soon.



OR



People at program distribution center in [**Pennsylvania** / **New Mexico** / **Africa** / **Latin America**]. Photo: AGP news

Do you think U.S. officials should cut the program, or should not cut the program?

0 Should cut the program.

1 Should not cut the program.

Figure 2: News Article With Randomizations

The news article also contains additional information about the program that is held constant across conditions. Respondents read that the program costs the U.S. government \$100 million and provides food packages to 150,000 people living below the poverty line. These

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People at program distribution center in Latin America. Photo: AGP news

Figure 3: YouGov Screenshot Example

constant items are included in order to control for any bias associated with misinformation about how much the program costs and how many people receive help from it. Hunger relief is specified as the type of redistribution as it is typically one of the least controversial types of assistance. At the end of the news article, respondents read that officials hope to make a decision about the program soon. After reading the news article, I ask respondents whether they think the officials should cut the program or should not cut the program. The responses to this question serve as my dependent variable.

While the focus of this paper is on support for international redistribution, I include a domestic redistribution condition as previous research suggests that a respondent's degree of acculturation in their host country may affect a number of domestic redistributive preferences. For example, in one study of Latino preferences, Branton (2007) finds that "less acculturated Latinos [measured by generational status] are more likely to support policy positions that distribute benefits to immigrants, the needy, and minority groups in general than when compared to "fully" acculturated Latinos."³⁶ Although this finding suggests support

³⁶Branton 2007, 301

for the cosmopolitan mechanism, as respondents with transnational ties are more likely to support aid to domestic minority groups generally, it also indicates that any relationship I discover between transnational ties and support for international redistribution may simply be due to underlying differences in a taste for redistribution between those with transnational ties and those without. To demonstrate that this effect is not a byproduct of different tastes for redistribution generally across varying levels of transnational ties, I examine support for the domestic assistance program as well. Support for the domestic program should be similar across groups to rule out the redistributive tastes argument.

Hypotheses

I use this data to test three main hypotheses. First, I expect support for the foreign aid program to be strongest among Latinos with transnational ties and weakest among Latinos with no transnational ties (H1). The second and third hypotheses relate to the mechanism behind the effect. I investigate the group interests mechanism using the *Latino* treatment. If transnational ties are correlated with foreign aid because of group interests, then we should see that the positive correlation between transnational ties and support for international redistribution is driven primarily by respondents in the Latin America condition. That is to say, the relationship between transnational ties and support for international redistribution should be conditional on treatment assignment to the Latin America treatment (H2). If, however, transnational ties *also* lead to a more cosmopolitan worldview, we should see a strong positive relationship between transnational ties and support for the program targeting foreign recipients in Africa as well (H3). Finding support for H3, does not rule out the group interests mechanism, but it would suggest that cosmopolitanism is an additional mechanism through which transnational ties affect support for foreign aid.

Findings

To test hypothesis H1, I first examine the distribution of support for the foreign aid program at each level of transnational ties. 55.1% of respondents with no transnational ties supported the foreign aid program (i.e. stated that they did not wish to cut the program) and that percentage increases significantly across each level of transnational ties. Among those with ties, 66.4% of respondents with weak ties support the foreign aid program and 74.7% of respondents with strong ties support the program. This increase across each level of ties is nearly monotonic and quite strong, with almost a ten percentage point increase moving from no ties across weak and strong ties.

Because the transnational ties measure is observed, however, and not experimentally manipulated, I also estimate probit regression models of the dependent variable that include a number of covariates to control for demographic characteristics of respondents that could be associated with both transnational ties and support for foreign aid. In these models, *Aid Support* is coded 1 if the respondent said not to cut the program and is coded 0 if the respondent said to cut the program.³⁷ The *Ties* variable is coded 0 if the respondent has no ties, 1 if the respondent has weak ties, and 2 if the respondent has strong ties. *Aid Support* is regressed on *Ties*, the *Foreign* treatment, and an interaction term between *Ties* and *Foreign*. In all models with control variables, the control variables include a binary indicator for gender (*Woman*), a continuous variable for *Age*, *Education* (six categories), a binary indicator for household *Income* less than \$30,000, a binary indicator for full-time *Employment*, a binary indicator for *Republican* party affiliation, a binary indicator for race (*White*), a four-category measure of trust in government (*GovTrust*), and a four-category measure of *Religiosity*.

³⁷A question that followed the dependent variable asked respondents how strongly they felt about the officials cutting or keeping the program. This question had four categories and from it an eight-category dependent variable was also created. The results do not change using this measure and thus the more simple binary dependent variable is used throughout the article.

The results confirm what we see in the raw distribution: Respondents with strong transnational ties are significantly more supportive of the foreign aid program than those without transnational ties. Table 1 holds the coefficients from the probit model and Figure 4 plots the predicted probabilities holding the control variables from Model 2 constant of supporting the aid program at each value of *Ties* for respondents in the domestic and foreign treatment conditions. As can be seen from the figure, there is a significant increase in support for the foreign aid program across the different categories of ties – as the strength of respondents’ ties increases so does support for the foreign aid program. While the probability of supporting the foreign aid program among respondents with weak ties is not significantly different from the other two categories, the difference in support between those respondents with strong ties and those with no ties is statistically significant and substantively quite large. Respondents with strong transnational ties have a significantly higher probability of supporting foreign aid than those with no transnational ties. These results provide support for H1 that transnational ties increase support for international redistribution.




Figure 4: **Predicted Probability of Supporting Domestic and Foreign Aid**

Moreover, as can be seen in Figure 4 there is no significant difference in support for

	Model 1	Model 2
Foreign	-1.01*** (0.137)	-1.06*** (0.140)
Ties	-0.15* (0.081)	-0.17** (0.083)
Foreign*Ties	0.42*** (0.105)	0.43*** (0.107)
Latino	0.09 (0.088)	0.10 (0.090)
Constant	1.09*** (0.115)	1.14*** (0.260)
Controls	No	Yes
Observations	1,000	1,000
Pseudo R2	0.06	0.10
Log likelihood	-536.69	-515.45

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: The table reports the probit coefficient estimates of the models of *Aid Support*. The dependent variable is a binary indicator coded 1 if respondents said officials should not cut the aid program and coded 0 if respondents said officials should cut the aid program. The Foreign variable captures treatment assignment in which individuals are randomly assigned to read about a domestic aid program (0) or a foreign aid program (1). Latino is a variable that captures treatment assignment in which individuals are randomly assigned to read that the program helps Latinos or people in Latin America (1) or to read that the program helps African-Americans or people in Africa (0). The model with control variables includes Age, Gender, Education, Income, Employment, Race, Party, Trust in Government and Religiosity. Heteroskedastic - consistent robust standard errors are in parentheses. All results are unweighted.

Table 1: **Support for Domestic and Foreign Aid by Transnational Ties**

the *domestic* program across the different categories of *Ties*. If anything, there is a slight decrease in support for the domestic program across the strength of transnational ties as respondents with strong transnational ties are slightly less supportive of the domestic pro-

gram. These results suggest that the effect of transnational ties on support for international redistribution does not seem to be driven by a difference in redistributive tastes or humanitarianism (discussed more below) across the three categories. Furthermore, these results reflect a pattern identified in other work that shows that individuals who support redistribution in the domestic context do not necessarily support it in the international context.³⁸ It is clear from the figure that across all levels of transnational ties, Latinos have extremely high support for domestic redistribution. Support for the international aid program only reaches the same level of support as the domestic program among individuals with strong ties.

Mechanisms

To investigate the role of group interests (H2) and cosmopolitanism (H3), I restrict the sample to those in the foreign aid condition. I estimate a probit regression model of *Aid Support* regressed on the binary indicator for the *Latino* treatment, *Ties*, and the interaction between *Latino* and *Ties*. I continue to include control variables to account for any bias associated with underlying demographic traits that are correlated with transnational ties and support for redistribution.

The results of the probit regression model can be found in Table 2 and Figure 5 graphically displays the predicted probabilities from Model 2 at each level of ties for respondents in the Africa and Latin America aid conditions. These results indicate support for the cosmopolitan mechanism, but cannot rule out the group interests mechanism for respondents in the Latin America treatment condition (more on this below). The effect of *Ties* on support for foreign aid is positive and significant and there is no interaction between *Ties* and the *Latino* treatment. In other words, respondents' support for foreign aid is not conditional on the location of the aid program. This can be seen clearly in Figure 5.

To further understand the mechanisms behind the relationship between transnational

³⁸Prather 2018

	Model 1	Model 2
Latino	0.09 (0.169)	0.11 (0.173)
Ties	0.26*** (0.100)	0.23** (0.103)
Latino*Ties	0.03 (0.136)	0.00 (0.139)
Constant	0.09 (0.124)	-0.03 (0.322)
Controls	No	Yes
Observations	507	507
Pseudo R2	0.03	0.07
Log likelihood	-320.05	-307.23

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: The table reports the probit coefficient estimates of the models of *Aid Support*. The dependent variable is a binary indicator coded 1 if respondents said officials should not cut the aid program and coded 0 if respondents said officials should cut the aid program. Latino is a variable that captures treatment assignment in which individuals are randomly assigned to read that the program helps people in Latin America (1) or to read that the program helps people in Africa (0). The model with control variables includes Age, Gender, Education, Income, Employment, Race, Party, Trust in Government and Religiosity. Heteroskedastic - consistent robust standard errors are in parentheses. All results are unweighted.

Table 2: **Support for Foreign Aid by Program Location and Transnational Ties**

ties and support for foreign aid, I examine the effect of *Ties* on two follow-up questions asked to respondents.³⁹ The first question asks if respondents feel that the U.S. government has a moral obligation to help the recipients of the program. If transnational ties cause

³⁹In addition to this analysis, three other analyses can be found in the Supporting Information. First, I examine how Latino group consciousness moderates the effect of transnational ties on support for foreign aid. This analysis addresses the fact that the group interests prime for Latinos in the experiment is their home *region* rather than home country. Second, I demonstrate using data from the World Values Survey that transnational ties are correlated with identification as a “world citizen”. Finally, I provide evidence that self-interest is an unlikely mechanism explaining the association between transnational ties and support for foreign aid.




Figure 5: Predicted Probability of Supporting Aid to Africa and Latin America




Figure 6: Predicted Level of Morality by Ties and Aid Program Location

individuals to have a more cosmopolitan disposition, then we would expect respondents with strong ties to believe the U.S. government has an equal moral obligation to help the African aid recipients and the Latin American aid recipients. The question appeared as follows:

- *Morality*: Do you agree or disagree that the U.S. government has a moral obligation to assist the recipients of this program? Strongly disagree - Strongly agree (4-categories)

I estimate an OLS model of *Morality* regressed on *Ties*, *Latino*, *Ties*Latino*, and the vector of control variables. Results from these models are in Table 3. Figure 6 holds the predicted values of *Morality* from Model 2 at each level of ties for those in the Africa and Latin America aid condition.

I find that the effect of *Ties* on beliefs that the government is morally obligated to assist the recipients of the program is positive and significant at the $p < 0.1$ level. These beliefs do not appear to be conditional on the location of the aid program. There is no significant interaction between *Ties* and the *Latino* treatment. More concretely, it appears that as the strength of a respondent's transnational ties increases so do their beliefs that the government has a moral duty to help the foreign poor *regardless* of the recipients' location.

Again, beliefs about obligations could be fueled by group interests or a more cosmopolitan world view. Thus, I further examine the group interests hypothesis by investigating responses to a second question. This question asks how likely the respondent is to view the foreign aid recipients as members of their in-group. As described in the theory, transnational ties may cause individuals to more strongly identify with a cross-border community and identifying potential recipients of foreign aid as members of one's in-group will cause respondents to support foreign aid at a higher level. Wong (2010) demonstrates that subjective measures of group identification are strongly correlated with preferences for policies that benefit that subjective in-group. Thus, I measure in-group using the question developed by Wong (2010) which measures the social groups with which individuals identify. The question is as follows.

- *In-Group*: How close do you feel, in terms of your ideas and interests, to the recipients of this program? Not at all close - Very close (4-categories)

Latino respondents should on average be more likely to say the Latin American foreign aid respondents are a part of their in-group than the African aid respondents. To test this,

	Model 1	Model 2
Latino	0.03 (0.127)	0.03 (0.125)
Ties	0.20*** (0.076)	0.14* (0.077)
Latino*Ties	-0.04 (0.098)	-0.04 (0.097)
Constant	2.57*** (0.096)	2.14*** (0.228)
Controls	No	Yes
Observations	507	507
R2	0.03	0.07

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: The table reports the OLS coefficient estimates of the models of *Morality*. *Morality* has four categories taking values 1-4 with higher values corresponding to stronger agreement with the statement that the U.S. government has a moral obligation to help the recipients of the foreign aid program. Latino is a variable that captures treatment assignment in which individuals are randomly assigned to read that the program helps people in Latin America (1) or to read that the program helps people in Africa (0). The model with control variables includes Age, Gender, Education, Income, Employment, Race, Party, Trust in Government and Religiosity. Heteroskedastic - consistent robust standard errors are in parentheses. All results are unweighted.

Table 3: Beliefs about Moral Obligations by Program Location and Transnational Ties

I estimate OLS models of *In-Group* regressed on *Ties* and the vector of control variables for both the respondents in the Africa aid treatment group and those in the Latin America treatment group. Results from these models are in Table 4. Comparing the relationship between *Ties* and *In-Group* in the two models reveals that *Ties* is only significantly correlated with *In-Group* among those in the Latin America treatment. Latinos with strong transnational

	Africa	Latin America
Ties	0.10 (0.078)	0.25*** (0.064)
Constant	1.51*** (0.305)	1.94*** (0.293)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	230	276
R2	0.10	0.14

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: The table reports the OLS coefficient estimates of the models of *In-Group*. In-Group has four categories taking values 1-4 with higher values corresponding to stronger feelings of shared identity with the foreign aid recipients. The control variables include Age, Gender, Education, Income, Employment, Race, Party, Trust in Government and Religiosity. Heteroskedastic - consistent robust standard errors are in parentheses. All results are unweighted.

Table 4: Identification with Foreign Aid Recipients by Program Location and Transnational Ties

ties are significantly more likely to identify the Latin American aid recipients as part of their in-group than are Latinos with no transnational ties. There is no such relationship in the Africa aid condition. Latinos with strong transnational ties are only slightly more likely to express common interests and ideas with the African aid recipients.

Mediation Analysis

Finally, I employ a non-parametric causal mediation model to estimate the average causal mediation effect (ACME) of transnational ties mediated by in-group identification.⁴⁰ This estimate provides evidence as to whether perceiving aid recipients as members of one's in-

⁴⁰Imai et al. 2011.

group is the mechanism through which transnational ties affects support for foreign aid to Latin America. There is no need to do this analysis for the sample receiving the Africa aid treatment since the mediator (*In-Group*) can be ruled out given the null result reported in Table 4. In other words, group interests do not explain the positive relationship between transnational ties and support for foreign aid to Africa. As can be seen in Model 1 of Table 5, the *Ties* variable is significantly and positively associated with perceptions of Latin American aid recipients as members of their in-group. Model 2 further shows that respondents with strong transnational ties are more supportive of foreign aid to Latin America than respondents with weaker or no transnational ties.

As Model 3 shows, when we control for one of the hypothesized mechanisms, *In-Group*, the effect of *Ties* loses significance, whereas *In-Group* is highly correlated with *Aid Support*. In other words, people who perceived the Latin America aid recipients to be members of their in-group, were significantly more likely to support foreign aid to Latin America. We would expect to see this pattern if *In-Group* mediates the effect of *Ties* on *Aid Support*. I next estimate the mediated effect using the non-parametric modeling technique cited above. Model 4 shows that the estimated average causal mediated effect is positive and statistically significant. Moreover, the causal mediation analysis estimates that around 49% of the total effect of *Ties* on support for foreign aid to Latin America is due to group identification.

Discussion

The results from these analyses provide evidence in favor of H1: Latino respondents with strong transnational ties are more supportive of foreign aid than respondents without strong transnational ties. Although they are more supportive of foreign aid, Latinos with strong transnational ties do not seem to be more supportive of domestic redistribution as previous research has suggested.⁴¹ Rather transnational ties only seem to raise Latino support for the

⁴¹Branton 2007

	Model 1 (In-Group)	Model 2 (Aid Support)	Model 3 (Aid Support)	Model 4 (ACME)
In-Group			0.55*** (0.105)	0.04** (0.02, 0.07)
Ties	0.25*** (0.064)	0.26*** (0.099)	0.14 (0.103)	
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>N</i>	276	276	276	276

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed)

Notes: This table reports the coefficient estimates from an OLS regression model (Models 1) and probit models (Models 2-3) with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. In Model 1, *In-Group* is the dependent variable. In Models 2 and 3, *Aid Support* is the dependent variable. All models include the control variables included in all other models. The nonparametric estimate of the ACME uses Models 1 and 3. Column 4 holds the ACME for *Joint* and the 95% quasi-Bayesian confidence interval derived from 1,500 simulations is in parentheses. 49% of the total effect of *Ties* on *Aid Support* is mediated by in-group identification. The sample is restricted to respondents in the Latin America treatment condition.

Table 5: Perception of in-group identification with Latin American aid recipients mediates the effect of ties on support for foreign aid to Latin America.

foreign aid program.

Turning to mechanisms, I argued that prior research assumes this effect is driven by group-based interests and proposed an additional theory, that the transnational practices associated with international migration and maintaining personal connections abroad could result in a cosmopolitan worldview. I hypothesized that these two mechanisms lead to different observable implications about whether or not the link between transnational ties and support for foreign aid is conditional on the location of the foreign aid recipients. The results presented above provide strong evidence that transnational ties increase support for foreign aid *regardless* of the location of the aid program. Moreover, respondents with strong ties are more likely to believe the U.S. government has a moral obligation to help the recipients of the aid program, regardless of location. I show that group interests do not explain the higher support for aid to Africa among respondents with transnational ties. Instead, I argue that this positive relationship is due to a more cosmopolitan mindset among

respondents with strong transnational ties. Finally, while cosmopolitanism is notoriously hard to measure, I provide additional evidence for this mechanism using data from the World Values Survey in the Supporting Information. There, I show that Latinos' strength of transnational ties is correlated with a higher likelihood of identifying as a "world citizen".⁴²

The role of group interests appears to be more complicated. First, as stated above, group interests do not appear to be driving the effect of *Ties* on support for aid among respondents in the African aid condition. However, strength of ties demonstrates a strong, positive correlation with perceptions of in-group identification for respondents in the Latin America aid condition. This is important because although I did not ask respondents to consider the country where they have ties, respondents with strong ties were still more likely to view the Latin American aid recipients as members of their in-group than those without strong ties. The causal mediation analysis further demonstrates that about half of the effect of transnational ties on support for foreign aid to Latin America is due to in-group identification. I argue that the rest of the effect is due to cosmopolitanism. This is because support for aid to other Latin American countries where Latino respondents do not have ties may also require a more cosmopolitan mindset.⁴³

⁴²A similar mechanism to cosmopolitanism linking transnational ties to higher support for foreign aid could be higher levels of humanitarian concern among those with strong transnational ties. An observable implication of this would be that individuals with strong transnational ties would have higher support for both domestic and international welfare recipients than those with weaker ties. This follows from past research has shown that more humanitarian individuals tend to be more supportive of social welfare programs (Feldman and Steenbergen, 2001). Instead, we see that the strength of transnational ties is only significantly associated with support for foreign aid. It is likely that individuals with transnational ties have a some level of humanitarian concern, but it is only when they either identify with the recipients or have a cosmopolitan identity that this humanitarian concern is applied to individuals beyond their national border.

⁴³One might also ask whether individuals with strong transnational ties are more supportive of foreign aid for self-interested reasons. They could want higher levels of foreign aid in order to prevent further migration. As can be seen in the Supporting Information, self-interest does not appear to be a mechanism linking transnational ties and support for foreign aid. Instead, individuals with strong transnational ties appear to be *more* supportive of immigration than individuals with weak transnational ties.

Generalizability

While I have made an argument for why I think Latino Americans are the best case with which to test the theory, one might also want to know whether transnational ties have effects beyond the Latino American community. Therefore, I examine the effects of transnational ties on attitudes towards foreign aid among a national sample of Americans and a national sample of respondents from the United Kingdom surveyed in 2014.⁴⁴ Both the U.S. and UK studies feature a similar vignette to the one fielded to the Latino sample. For the national samples, however, respondents are primed to think the recipients of the foreign aid program are of either a white racial background or a black racial background. The race cue in both surveys is only a photo that depicts recipients waiting in a queue. The dependent variable remains the same: Respondents are asked whether they think their government should cut or should not cut a foreign aid program. The main independent variable, *Ties*, is coded identically. The table below reports the percentage of respondents in each category of ties in each national sample by racial and ethnic group.

	US White	US Black	US Latino	US Other Groups	UK White	UK Non-White
Strong Ties	10	14	49	25	12	50
Weak Ties	23	13	23	24	40	29
No Ties	67	73	28	51	48	21
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	937	135	158	59	1,050	119

Table 6: **Percentage of Respondents in Each Category of Ties by Social Groups**

As can be seen in Table 6, Latinos in the U.S. and non-white respondents in the UK have the highest percentage of respondents with strong transnational ties at around fifty percent of the sample. On the other hand, few white respondents in either the U.S. or the UK

⁴⁴In the British sample, there were so few respondents in each non-white minority category that I pooled these respondents together in the analysis.

have strong ties. Where these two groups diverge is in the percentage of white respondents with family living abroad. The percentage of white respondents in the UK with family living abroad is around double that of white respondents in the U.S. This likely reflects the relative ease with which individuals in the UK generally could move to other countries in the European Union at the time of the survey. Whites in the U.S. have relatively fewer opportunities to move abroad. Finally, if we look at black respondents in the U.S., we see that they are similar to whites in the U.S. in terms of the percentage of respondents with ties and no ties. Other social groups include Asian-Americans, those of Middle Eastern background, or those who select mixed race or other. These groups are pooled together due to their small sample size and in general they look more similar to Latinos with around half reporting that they have some sort of ties abroad.

	US White	US Black	US Latino	US Other Groups	UK White	UK Non-White
Ties	-0.01 (0.066)	-0.17 (0.175)	0.16 (0.132)	-0.07 (0.256)	0.11* (0.062)	0.35** (0.161)
Constant	-0.03 (0.223)	0.40 (0.754)	0.89 (0.640)	1.77 (1.274)	-1.04*** (0.185)	-0.73 (0.567)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	936	134	158	59	1,050	119
Pseudo R2	0.08	0.11	0.11	0.29	0.06	0.08
Log likelihood	-593.03	-70.30	-91.29	-28.68	-593.34	-74.11

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: The table reports the probit coefficient estimates of the models of *Aid Support*. The dependent variable is a binary indicator coded 1 if respondents said officials should not cut the aid program and coded 0 if respondents said officials should cut the aid program. American models include the control variables of Age, Gender, Education, Income, Employment, Ideology, and Religiosity. British models include the control variables of Age, Gender, Education, Employment, Ideology, and Religiosity. Heteroskedastic - consistent robust standard errors are in parentheses. All results are unweighted.

Table 7: The Relationship between Ties and Foreign Aid Support in US and UK National Samples by Racial and Ethnic Groups

To understand the generalizability of the findings from the Latino survey, we can examine the effect of *Ties* on *Aid Support* for each group. Each model replicates the models from the Latino survey using similar control variables and probit regressions. The results from the probit regression models are in Table 7. For the U.S. national sample, the only group for whom *Ties* is positively associated with foreign aid support is Latinos. Among Latinos, there is a difference in the predicted probability of supporting the aid program between those with strong ties and those without ties of about 0.11. Although this effect is not significant at traditional levels due to the small number of Latinos in the nationally representative sample, it is consistent with the effect size from the Latino survey. For whites, blacks, and other social groups, the effect is either null, or in the case of black U.S. respondents, in the negative direction. Although the sample size for black respondents and respondents of other racial and ethnic groups is quite small, the large sample size of white respondents means that we can investigate the null result further by examining how the race treatment (that primed individuals to think recipients were white or black) might have affected support for the foreign aid program.

When one examines the interaction between the race treatment, ties, and support for foreign aid, an interesting pattern emerges. Although among Latinos, I do not find evidence that group interests play a strong role, there is evidence among white respondents that group interests have a stronger effect. One can see the marginal effect of the race treatment at each level of *Ties* in Figure 7. White respondents with no ties abroad are significantly more likely to support the foreign aid program when primed to think it helps recipients of a black racial background rather than a white racial background.⁴⁵ The likelihood of supporting the foreign aid program that helps black recipients decreases significantly across the distribution of *Ties*, while the likelihood of supporting the foreign aid program that helps white recipients increases significantly as the strength of ties increases. These findings make clear that the

⁴⁵These results are consistent with the findings in Baker (2015).

null effect of *Ties* on foreign aid support may actually be the result of these competing trends and suggests that among white respondents the effect of *Ties* on foreign aid support may be due more to group interests than cosmopolitanism.




Figure 7: Predicted Probability of Aid Support by Race of Recipient and Ties among White Respondents in U.S. Sample




Figure 8: Predicted Probability of Aid Support by Race of Recipient and Ties among White Respondents in UK Sample

Turning to the results in the UK, because the sample is mostly white (around 90%) and the size of any one ethnic group in the remaining 10% is so small, I simply divide the UK sample into white and non-white respondents. As can be seen in Table 7, *Ties* is significantly positively associated with support for foreign aid among both whites and non-whites. The difference in the probability of supporting foreign aid between white respondents with strong ties and those without ties is around 0.07. Among non-whites the size of the effect is much larger. The difference in the probability of supporting the aid program between non-whites with ties and those without is around 0.26. Again, among white respondents in the sample, we can see what part of the difference in the size of the effects is due to the interaction between the measure of ties and the race treatment. Figure 8 holds the predicted probabilities from the interaction. Although there is no longer a negative effect of ties on support for foreign aid that is targeted towards black recipients, transnational ties do little to increase the likelihood of supporting a program that helps foreign recipients of a black racial background. Instead, the positive association between ties and foreign aid support is entirely due to those in the white recipients condition. The difference in the probability of supporting the foreign aid program among white respondents with strong ties and those without ties is around 0.15 for those in the white recipients condition.⁴⁶

The findings from these national samples add some interesting nuance to the relationship between transnational ties, foreign aid, and the mechanisms that link the two. First, it appears that the findings from the Latino Sample are confirmed in a much smaller sample in the U.S. Moreover, in the UK sample among non-whites — a group largely made up of Asian British, Black British, and British respondents from mixed heritage — this finding is also confirmed. There is a strong, positive correlation between the personal connections these individuals have to other countries and support for foreign aid. Second, in contrast to the findings from the Latino sample—that ties increase support for foreign aid regardless

⁴⁶For further analysis of the mechanisms behind these effects, see the Supporting Information.

of the location of recipients—the location of recipients appears to play a more significant role for white respondents in the U.S. and UK. While I observe that transnational ties do increase support for foreign aid, this effect appears to be limited to support for recipients in white majority countries. Why might we see a difference between whites and other minority groups in the mechanism behind the finding?

Although I am unable to explain the difference in findings using the data I have here, I can speculate that the reason may have to do with the highly salient racial cleavages in the U.S. and UK, and their relationship to issues of redistribution. Indeed, in his study of group interests and support for war, Berinsky (2009) states that, “It is the political environment that makes groups salient to political decision-making” (130). In the case of the U.S. and possibly the UK (see e.g. Soroka, Harell and Iyengar (2013)), the political environment is one in which group interests are highly salient to welfare politics, and particularly for the majority white population. Studies like Baker’s (2015) have also demonstrated that although it may be racial paternalism and not racial animosity that structures support for foreign aid among white Americans, group-based reasoning is nonetheless front of mind for the issue of foreign aid. Indeed, my findings add another layer to Baker’s such that I confirm that the majority of white Americans (those without transnational ties) are more supportive of foreign aid to black recipients than white recipients, however this effect reverses among white respondents with strong ties to other countries. Thus, not only do studies like Baker’s need to account for the factors that shape individuals’ political attitudes towards out-groups, but also those that shape individuals’ attitudes towards in-groups. It may be that on average whites in developed countries like the U.S. and UK have few ties abroad and thus may prefer aid to black recipients over aid to white recipients. However, when white respondents have connections abroad, their preferences for who should benefit from foreign aid appear to align more closely with what benefits their transnational in-group.

Conclusion

This article investigates how transnational ties affect individual support for foreign aid. It proposes and tests two mechanisms behind the effect – group interests and cosmopolitanism. Counter to previous studies that tend to focus on group interests among diaspora members, my study of Latinos’ attitudes towards foreign aid demonstrates that cosmopolitanism is an important mechanism linking transnational ties and support for foreign aid. Transnational ties increase support for foreign aid broadly rather than to only members of a specific cross-border community, although group interests play some role in explaining support for aid to Latin America. Examining the effects of transnational ties among other racial and ethnic groups, however, suggests that the significance of these two causal pathways varies across groups.

These findings encourage future work on this topic. First, future research could examine the relationship between transnational ties and cosmopolitanism directly in addition to investigating the observable implications tested here. Measuring cosmopolitanism is not an easy task as the literature offers a range of definitions and potential operationalizations. However, initial evidence from the World Values Survey included in the Supporting Information is promising as it shows a correlation between one measure of cosmopolitanism and transnational ties. Second, while these results provide a starting point for examining the relationship between transnational ties and support for international redistribution, they are limited to studies of Latino respondents in the United States and two national samples. These findings should be replicated using oversamples of other minority groups from other countries to examine how the causal pathways linking ties and support for foreign aid may vary across groups. Finally, future work should examine how transnational ties shape support for other foreign policy attitudes such as trade, war, and immigration.

Although there is more work to be done, these findings alone have implications for how scholars study the impact of globalization and international migration. First, they demon-

strate that there is a link between transnational practices and cosmopolitanism. While this link has been examined in a general population⁴⁷, this study encourages scholars to investigate how the transnational practices of immigrants might also lead to a cosmopolitan worldview. Indeed as immigration continues to increase it will be important to understand how transnational connections affect the foreign policy preferences of individuals in these communities.

Second, it is surprising given the importance of the Latino American community that this is one of the first studies to rigorously investigate the foreign policy preferences of Latino Americans. To the extent that these studies exist, they primarily examine the preferences of Latinos for policies that affect their homelands.⁴⁸ Importantly, my study investigates the preferences of Latino respondents for policies beyond those that affect their homelands exclusively. This allows me to not only test the group interests mechanism that is assumed in much of the diaspora politics literature but to also discover a broader range of foreign policy attitudes. Indeed, the literature on Latino political behavior in the domestic context has investigated a range of policy preferences beyond just those that are thought to affect the Latino American community. Thus, it makes sense for scholars to investigate their foreign policy preferences in the same way.

Finally, this article makes a contribution to our understanding of the future direction of foreign policy in the United States. The findings indicate that as more individuals are able to maintain transnational ties to other countries, we may see an increase in support for foreign aid programs in the United States and a more internationalist foreign policy generally. This is especially important in a country in which foreign aid has historically been among the least supported programs and which has experience a recent turn towards a more parochial mindset among a large fraction of the American public.

⁴⁷Helbling and Teney 2015

⁴⁸e.g. Pachon and de la Garza 2000

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Supporting Information

This appendix contains information that is supplemental to “Transnational Ties and Support for Foreign Aid.”

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A Summary Statistics and Balance Tests

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Age	36.26	13.52	18	78	507
Gender	0.54	0.50	0	1	507
Education	2.59	1.17	1	6	507
Low Income	0.40	0.49	0	1	507
Employed	0.37	0.48	0	1	507
White	0.11	0.32	0	1	507
Republican	0.12	0.33	0	1	507
Trust in Gov.	2.82	1.00	1	5	507
Religiosity	2.93	1.06	1	4	507
Ties	0.96	0.86	0	2	507
Spanish Ability	2.86	1.10	1	4	507

Note: Summary statistics are only provided for respondents in the foreign treatment condition.

Table A.1: **Summary statistics**

Variable	Mean		P-Value for test that: LA=AF
	Latin America (LA)	Africa (AF)	
Age	36.866 [13.85]	35.537 [13.114]	0.271
Gender	0.569 [0.496]	0.515 [0.501]	0.228
Education	2.63 [1.17]	2.55 [1.171]	0.44
Low Income	0.424 [0.495]	0.377 [0.486]	0.28
Employed	0.333 [0.472]	0.407 [0.492]	0.087
White	0.13 [0.337]	0.091 [0.288]	0.161
Republican	0.101 [0.302]	0.152 [0.359]	0.089
Trust in Gov.	2.79 [0.998]	2.866 [0.993]	0.393
Religiosity	2.917 [1.046]	2.944 [1.068]	0.774
Ties	0.96 [0.858]	0.961 [0.866]	0.991
Spanish Ability	2.822 [1.112]	2.9 [1.089]	0.428

Note: Averages for each treatment condition of key variables. Standard deviation in brackets. P-Value based on OLS regressions of variable on treatment. The N for all variables is 507.

Table A.2: **Balance tests**

B Robustness with Alternate Coding of Transnational Ties

In this section, I create a measure of transnational ties using the same questions from the main text, but a different coding rule. I create an additive index in which the maximum value is 3 (being born abroad, sending remittances, *and* having friends and family abroad) and the minimum value is having none of these attributes (0). Values coded as 2 and 1 correspond to individuals that have any two of the traits or any one of the traits respectively. I reproduce the core findings from Figures 4 and 5 using both a linear model and a more flexible model that does not impose linearity on the *Ties* variable. The results hold using this measure of ties and a more flexible modeling strategy.




Figure B.1: Predicted Probability of Supporting Domestic and Foreign Aid at Each Level of Ties (Linear)




Figure B.2: **Predicted Probability of Supporting Aid to Latin America and Africa at Each Level of Ties (Linear)**




Figure B.3: Predicted Probability of Supporting Domestic and Foreign Aid at Each Level of Ties (Non-Linear)




Figure B.4: Predicted Probability of Supporting Aid to Latin America and Africa at Each Level of Ties (Non-Linear)

C Robustness with Spanish Speaking Ability

In this section, I replicate Figures 4 and 5 using an alternative measure of transnational ties: Spanish speaking ability. As noted in the main text, there is a near monotonic increase in Spanish speaking ability across my measure of ties. The results hold using this alternative measure of ties.




Figure C.1: Predicted Probability of Supporting Domestic and Foreign Aid by Spanish Speaking Ability




Figure C.2: Predicted Probability of Supporting Aid to Latin America and Africa by Spanish Speaking Ability

D Latino Group Consciousness as Moderator

This section explores the role of Latino group consciousness in moderating the effect of transnational ties on support for foreign aid. Specifically, one could argue that the experimental design with respect to the Latin American aid recipients also primes cosmopolitanism since it does not prime respondents with their country of origin or the country to which they have transnational ties. While the treatment stated that the aid program would help countries in Latin America, it did not specify which country in Latin America would receive aid or condition the country on the respondent's national or ancestral origin. Group interests may have been an even stronger mechanism linking ties with support for foreign aid if respondents were asked to consider the country where they had strong ties.

Although I did not have a treatment that treated respondents with the country to which they have ties, we can still ask for which members of the Latino community might the Latin America treatment still be a strong group treatment. Thus, this supplementary analysis examines the moderating effect of respondents' Latino group consciousness (whether they identify with the Latino-American community as a whole rather than only with Latinos who share their country of origin) on the relationship between transnational ties and support for foreign aid.

First, it is necessary to briefly discuss group consciousness and how it is measured. Group consciousness among Latinos refers to the extent to which a Latino American identifies with Latinos as a group rather than or in addition to those individuals who share the same national ancestry. Previous research suggests that individuals with high levels of group consciousness are more likely to have political preferences structured by group-based interests.¹ One of the key ways group consciousness is measured is by examining individual beliefs about linked fate.² Linked fate captures the extent to which a respondent believes her well-being depends on others in her social group (in this case other Latinos) doing well.

Although I cannot invalidate the idea that group interests might be primed more strongly with the country to which respondents have ties, I can examine whether group interests are more strongly primed by the home *region* among those with high levels of Latino group consciousness. Specifically, if group interests, rather than cosmopolitanism is the mechanism through which ties increase support for foreign aid *and* the Latin America treatment is only a relevant group for Latinos with high group consciousness, then I expect the relationship between transnational ties and support for foreign aid to be conditional on the level of Latino

¹Dawson 1995

²Ibid.

group consciousness. In particular, I hypothesize that the relationship between transnational ties and support for foreign aid to Latin America should be much weaker among those with low levels of Latino group consciousness and strong and positive among those with high levels of group consciousness.

To test this hypothesis, I use a measure of linked fate which has been used in previous research to study Latino group consciousness.³ The question asks respondents the extent to which their personal well-being depends on how well other Latinos in the United States are doing. I create a measure called *Linked Fate* and code respondents as having high group consciousness (1) if they answered “some” or “a lot” to this question (around forty-one percent of the sample). I code respondents as having low group consciousness (0) if they answered “a little” or “not at all” (around fifty-nine percent of the sample).

Table D.1 holds the results from the probit regression models of *Aid Support* regressed on *Ties*, *Linked Fate*, *Ties * Linked Fate*, and the control variables. I also estimate the predicted probability of supporting the aid program at each level of ties for respondents with low and high Latino group consciousness. These are presented graphically in Figure D.1 for those in the Africa aid condition and Figure D.2 for those in the Latin America aid condition.




Figure D.1: Predicted Probability of Support for Aid to Africa by Ties and Group Consciousness

The findings from this analysis show that the Latin America treatment does prime group

³Masouka 2006

	Africa 1	Africa 2	Latino 1	Latino 2
Ties	0.26** (0.129)	0.18 (0.142)	0.42*** (0.132)	0.44*** (0.141)
Linked Fate	0.43 (0.265)	0.30 (0.285)	0.71*** (0.248)	0.76*** (0.262)
Ties * Linked Fate	-0.07 (0.207)	-0.04 (0.221)	-0.36* (0.192)	-0.42** (0.200)
Constant	-0.06 (0.154)	-0.41 (0.455)	-0.08 (0.146)	-0.04 (0.492)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	231	231	276	276
Pseudo R2	0.04	0.12	0.05	0.09
Log likelihood	-146.92	-134.17	-166.67	-159.04

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: The table reports the probit coefficient estimates of the models of *Aid Support*. The dependent variable is a binary indicator coded 1 if respondents said officials should not cut the aid program and coded 0 if respondents said officials should cut the aid program. The models with control variables includes Age, Gender, Education, Income, Employment, Race, Party, Trust in Government and Religiosity. Heteroskedastic - consistent robust standard errors are in parentheses. All results are unweighted.

Table D.1: **The Interactive Effects of Linked Fate and Transnational Ties**

interests for some Latinos. Moreover, Latino group consciousness only moderates the relationship between ties and support for foreign aid among respondents in the Latin America treatment condition. While respondents with high levels of Latino group consciousness are slightly more supportive of aid to Africa at each level of transnational ties, the strength of the correlation is quite similar for both respondents with high levels of group consciousness and those with low levels of group consciousness. This makes sense as there is very little reason to suspect that the linked fate respondents feel to other Latinos in the United States should affect their support for foreign aid to Africa.

On the other hand, Latino group consciousness significantly moderates the relationship between transnational ties and support for foreign aid to Latin America. As noted above, I hypothesized that because the treatment stated rather generally that the foreign aid program helped countries in Latin America, only respondents who felt a sense of Latino group consciousness might be primed to think in terms of group interests. Thus, we might see




Figure D.2: Predicted Probability of Support for Aid to Latin America by Ties and Group Consciousness

a weak positive correlation between transnational ties and support for foreign aid among those with low group consciousness and a much stronger relationship between transnational ties and support for foreign aid to Latin America among those with high levels of group consciousness. Surprisingly, I find the reverse.

In Figure D.2, one can see that support for foreign aid to Latin America is high *regardless* of the strength of the respondent’s ties among respondents with high levels of group consciousness. In other words, even respondents with no transnational ties are highly supportive of foreign aid to Latin America if they have high Latino group consciousness. Among respondents with low group consciousness on the other hand, transnational ties have a significant and positive effect on support for foreign aid to Latin America, which suggests that in fact the treatment was not too weak.

Thus, it appears that group consciousness does have a role to play, but that role is not as a mechanism driving the effect of transnational ties on support for foreign aid. Instead, these results suggest that when transnational ties are absent, group consciousness can act as a substitute for personal ties abroad and lift support for foreign aid benefiting foreign group members. Transnational ties then close the gap in support for foreign aid to Latin America between Latinos with low group consciousness and those with high group consciousness. Moreover, we can think of the strong positive correlation between ties and support for foreign aid among those with low group consciousness as indicating further support for the

cosmopolitanism mechanism. Although some respondents with strong ties are unlikely to think of the Latin American aid recipients as members of their group (i.e. those with low group consciousness), they still support foreign aid to that region at a significantly higher level than respondents with no ties and low group consciousness.

E Transnational Ties and Self-interest

An alternative explanation that could explain greater support for foreign aid among Latino respondents with transnational ties is that respondents with strong ties may be more supportive of foreign aid as a way to prevent low-skilled migration from developing countries. While the survey I fielded cannot address this directly, I can assess an observable implication of this theory. If it is true that respondents with strong transnational ties view low-skilled migration as a threat to their economic well-being, then they should support more restrictive immigration policies and have worse opinions about the economic impact of migrants. The survey includes a question measuring support for immigration policies towards undocumented immigrants as well as a question measuring respondents' perceptions of the economic impact of immigration. Specifically, the two questions are:

- What is your preferred policy on undocumented immigration? Should there be
 1. (Base Category) Immediate legalization of current undocumented immigrants
 2. (*Guest Worker*) Guest worker program leading to legalization
 3. (*No Path*) A guest worker program that permits immigrants to be in the country
 4. (*Close Border*) An effort to seal or close off the border to stop illegal immigration
 5. (*None*) None of these
- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “It is generally bad for America’s economy that people come to live here from other countries.”

The results displayed in Table E.1 demonstrate that transnational ties are strongly correlated with support for less restrictive immigration policy. Relative to the baseline category of immediate legalization, stronger ties are consistently negatively correlated with support for more restrictive options such as a guest worker program with no path to citizenship and closing off the border.

One concern might be that respondents with strong ties support legalization because they themselves are undocumented. Although I did not include a measure of legal status of the

	Guest Worker	No Path	Close Border
Ties	-0.22 (0.189)	-0.40** (0.202)	-0.65*** (0.209)
Constant	1.57** (0.793)	1.36 (0.860)	0.65 (0.890)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	507	507	507
Pseudo R2		0.06	

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: The table reports the multinomial logit coefficient estimates for each of the categorical responses related to immigration policy. Each column represents a different immigration policy option and baseline for each is the most liberal policy option: immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants. All models include control variables for Age, Gender, Education, Income, Employment, Race, Party, Trust in Government and Religiosity. All results are unweighted.

Table E.1: **Transnational Ties and Support for Policies towards Undocumented Immigrants.**

respondent (this is a controversial question to include in surveys of diaspora communities), I did ask questions about naturalization of respondents who were born abroad. 40 percent of respondents who were born abroad stated that they were not naturalized citizens. While this does not necessarily mean these respondents are illegal or undocumented, we can drop them from the analysis as a robustness check. The results do not change when we drop respondents who are not naturalized citizens.

Table E.2 also demonstrates that transnational ties are associated with more liberal attitudes on immigration. When asked whether immigrants are bad for the U.S. economy, Latinos with strong transnational ties are less likely to agree with the statement than respondents with weaker transnational ties. Together these results provide considerable evidence against the hypothesis that respondents with transnational ties are supporting foreign aid as a way to prevent immigration. If this were the case, we should also see less liberal immigration policy preferences and beliefs about immigrants among respondents with transnational ties. Instead, we see respondents with transnational ties having *more* liberal attitudes towards immigration than respondents with weaker ties.

	Model 1	Model 2
Ties	-0.16** (0.065)	-0.18** (0.069)
Constant	3.43*** (0.086)	3.65*** (0.304)
Controls	No	Yes
Observations	451	451
R2	0.01	0.05

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: The table reports the coefficient estimates from OLS regression models. The dependent variable is a 5-category variable measuring the extent to which a respondent agrees that immigrants are bad for the U.S. economy. The model with control variables includes Age, Gender, Education, Income, Employment, Race, Party, Trust in Government and Religiosity. All results are unweighted.

Table E.2: **Transnational Ties and Perceptions of the Economic Costs of Immigration.**

F Transnational Ties and Cosmopolitanism

As noted in the main manuscript, cosmopolitanism is a notoriously hard concept to conceptualize and measure in surveys, yet it may be helpful to understand the correlation between ties and one of these measures. Although I did not include a measure of cosmopolitanism in the survey of Latinos, I can look to other surveys that include both measures of ties and cosmopolitanism. One common measure of cosmopolitanism is to ask how likely is someone to identify as a “world citizen” compared to another identity. This measure is available in the most recent version of the World Values Survey (Wave 6), which was fielded closest in time to the Latino survey.

To test the hypothesis that stronger transnational ties are associated with higher levels of cosmopolitanism, I first create a measure of cosmopolitanism that subtracts a respondent’s tendency to agree with the following statement “I see myself as part of the United States” from her likelihood of agreeing with this statement: “I see myself as a world citizen”. In the analysis below, the dependent variable is *Cosmopolitanism*. The variable ranges from -3 to 2 with higher values corresponding to greater identification as a world citizen than as a part of the United States. A score of 0 means that respondents were equally likely to agree with both statements. Around 60% of Latino respondents were equally likely to agree (or disagree) with both statements. Of these 60%, 35% were equally likely to say they agreed “somewhat” with both statements and 23% were equally likely to say they agreed “strongly” with both statements.

The second variable I need for this analysis is a measure of transnational ties. Although the World Values Survey does not include the exact questions I used to create the measure of ties from the Latino analysis, it does include questions about where respondents’ parents were born and where they themselves were born. I create the variable *Ties* using these two questions. A respondent is coded as having no ties (0) if both parents were born in the U.S. and they themselves were born in the U.S. I code a respondent as having strong ties (2) if they were born abroad. Finally a respondent is coded as having weak ties if they were born in the U.S., but at least one of their parents was born in another country.

Table F.1 contains the estimates from OLS regression models of *Cosmopolitanism* regressed on the measure of transnational ties. There is a strong and significant positive correlation between *Ties* and *Cosmopolitanism*. In other words, Latino respondents with strong ties are more likely to identify as a world citizen than as a part of the United States than respondents with weaker ties. Unfortunately, the World Values Survey did not include a question measuring support for foreign aid, but as noted in the main text, other studies

	Model 1	Model 2
Ties	0.15** (0.058)	0.16** (0.068)
Constant	-0.38 (0.091)	0.61 (0.577)
Controls	No	Yes
Observations	259	259
R2	0.02	0.23

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: The table reports the OLS coefficient estimates of the models of *Cosmopolitanism*. The model with control variables includes Age, Gender, Education, Income, Employment, Party, Trust in Government and Religiosity. Heteroskedastic - consistent robust standard errors are in parentheses. The sample is limited to respondents who identified their ethnicity as “Hispanic”. All results are unweighted.

Table F.1: Transnational Ties and Cosmopolitanism among Latino Respondents in World Values Survey Wave 6

have demonstrated that cosmopolitanism is positively correlated with support for foreign aid. Regardless, this test demonstrates using out-of-sample data that transnational ties are positively correlated with a cosmopolitan disposition among Latino respondents.

G Mechanisms Linking Ties and Aid Support among White respondents

As discussed in the main text, there is no correlation between transnational ties and support for foreign aid to black aid recipients among white respondents in the U.S. or UK. On the other hand, transnational ties have a strong and positive association with support for aid to white aid recipients among white respondents. In this section of the SI, I explore further two mechanisms behind this effect. First, I rule out an alternative explanation that white British respondents view immigration from poor white countries as a threat and thus support more foreign aid as a way to prevent immigration. Second, I demonstrate that transnational ties are not associated with a cosmopolitan disposition among white respondents in the UK or

U.S., but ties are associated with strong perceptions that white recipients are members of white respondents' in-group.

	Model 1	Model 2
Ties	0.10*** (0.024)	0.08*** (0.023)
Constant	0.43*** (0.022)	0.44*** (0.069)
Controls	No	Yes
Observations	1,050	1,050
R2	0.02	0.10

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: The table reports the coefficient estimates from OLS regression models. The dependent variable is scale of the average response to two questions that measure support for immigration. The scale ranges in value from 0 to 1.5. The model with control variables includes Age, Gender, Education, Employment, Party, and Religiosity. The sample is limited to white respondents. All results are unweighted.

Table G.1: **Transnational Ties and Support for Immigration in the UK.**

First, as noted elsewhere in the SI, one explanation for why individuals with transnational ties support foreign aid at higher levels may be that they view further immigration as a threat to their economic livelihoods. An observable implication of this argument is that individuals with strong transnational ties should favor more restrictive immigration policies and have overall negative views of immigration. To test this mechanism, I use a scale created from two questions in the UK survey on immigration. The first question asks respondents whether they think the level of immigration into Britain over the last decade has been a good or bad thing for Britain, or neither good nor bad. The second question asks respondents whether they think the British government should reduce the number of skilled workers who are allowed to emigrate to Britain. I create a variable *Immigration* that is the average of the responses to these two questions, where lower values indicate less support for immigration. In Table G.1 above, I demonstrate that among white respondents in the UK, the level of transnational ties has a strong and significant *positive* association with support for immigration in Britain. Again if transnational ties are positively associated with foreign aid because people with strong ties want to prevent migration, we would expect to see the opposite effect of ties on

support for immigration.

Next, I investigate the mechanisms detailed in the manuscript. In the main text, I argued that respondents with transnational ties may support foreign aid at a higher rate than individuals without transnational ties due to group interests and cosmopolitanism. The evidence presented in the main text suggests that white respondents may be more driven by group interests than cosmopolitanism. I show that the transnational ties of white respondents are not associated with support for foreign aid to black aid recipients. There is, however, a strong, positive correlation between white respondents' ties and support to white aid recipients. I present two pieces of evidence below to further underscore this finding.

First, I use a measure of cosmopolitanism available in both the U.S. and UK survey. The question measuring cosmopolitanism asked respondents to agree or disagree with the following statement: "I think of myself first and foremost as a member of the human race, rather than as a member of any national, ethnic, or racial group."⁴ For the British sample, as can be seen in Table G.2 below, *Ties* has a small and insignificant positive correlation with cosmopolitanism. Additionally, the measure of in-group perceptions used in the Latino analysis is also available in the British and American surveys. As can also be seen in Table G.2, transnational ties among white British respondents have a strong and positive correlation with perceptions that the white recipients of foreign aid are members of the respondent's in-group, while there is no correlation between ties and perceptions that the black recipients are members of the respondent's in-group. Table G.3 replicates these results almost exactly among U.S. white respondents. Together, these results provide strong evidence that group interests drive the correlation between white respondents' transnational ties and support for aid to white recipients, rather than cosmopolitanism or self-interest related to immigration.

⁴This question was included as a part of a broader political attitudes survey fielded with other scholars.

	Cosmopolitanism	In-Group White Recipients	In-Group Black Recipients
Ties	0.09 (0.068)	0.19*** (0.057)	0.03 (0.054)
Constant	3.79*** (0.196)	1.90*** (0.166)	1.77*** (0.152)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,050	520	530
R2	0.05	0.13	0.08

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: The table reports the coefficient estimates from OLS regression models. Each column represents a different dependent variable. All models include control variables for Age, Gender, Education, Employment, Party, and Religiosity. The sample is limited to white respondents. All results are unweighted.

Table G.2: **Transnational Ties, Cosmopolitanism, and In-Group Perceptions in the UK.**

	Cosmopolitanism	In-Group White Recipients	In-Group Black Recipients
Ties	-0.02 (0.086)	0.18*** (0.062)	0.06 (0.063)
Constant	4.90*** (0.292)	2.30*** (0.208)	2.50*** (0.214)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	936	476	460
R2	0.05	0.10	0.09

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: The table reports the coefficient estimates from OLS regression models. Each column represents a different dependent variable. All models include control variables for Age, Gender, Education, Employment, Income, Ideology, and Religiosity. The sample is limited to white respondents. All results are unweighted.

Table G.3: **Transnational Ties, Cosmopolitanism, and In-Group Perceptions in the U.S.**