

Transnational Ties and Support for International Redistribution

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Abstract

What are the effects of transnational ties on individual support for international redistribution? Although globalization and international migration have led more people than ever to have personal connections that cross national borders, we know little about how these personal connections affect attitudes towards foreign aid. In this study, I argue that transnational ties increase support for foreign aid via two possible mechanisms: group interests and cosmopolitanism. I test this theory using an original survey experiment embedded in a national survey of 1,000 Latino Americans. I find that Latinos vary significantly in the strength of their foreign ties and the strength of these ties is strongly correlated with support for U.S. foreign aid. The findings from the experiment, which varies the location of a U.S. foreign aid program, provides evidence in support of the cosmopolitan mechanism: Latinos with transnational ties equally support aid to Africa and aid to Latin America. This study introduces an important new explanatory variable into the study of international redistribution and provides insight into the emerging link between international migration and foreign aid.

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In Nye and Keohane’s collection on transnational politics, scholars identify a range of institutions through which individuals can maintain relationships across national borders such as multinational corporations, religious organizations, and activist groups.¹ More recently, as countries and people have become more connected through transnational processes such as globalization and international migration, researchers have started thinking about the relationships that exist outside of these institutional structures such as those in transnational social networks. Individuals in transnational social networks maintain these connections abroad through a variety of transnational practices. These practices are made easier with the ease of modern communication and international travel.² Today, someone who was born abroad or who has friends or family living abroad can connect with others in their transnational social networks fairly easily and at a relatively low cost just by picking up the phone or clicking a button. This more personal form of transnationalism, rather than that which exists within transnational institutions, is the subject of this article.

What are the effects of transnational ties on individual support for international redistribution? In this manuscript, I develop a theory that argues that transnational ties raise support for foreign aid via two possible mechanisms. The first mechanism is group interests. Work in international relations suggests that group attachments shape foreign policy preferences such as those towards war (e.g. Berinsky (2009)). While the literature on group interests and the welfare state suggests that group ties are a powerful determinant of support for redistribution in the domestic context (e.g. Alesina and Glaeser (2004)). Thus, I hypothesize that transnational ties between individuals in a cross-border community may raise support for international redistribution towards that community, but not more broadly.

Beyond group interests, I argue that an alternative mechanism – the cosmopolitan mechanism – may also lead individuals with transnational ties to have greater support for foreign aid. Drawing on the transnationalism and cosmopolitanism literatures, I hypothesize that transnational ties may be associated with a cosmopolitan worldview – having worldly interests over parochial ones. Past research has found a relationship between transnational practices and cosmopolitanism, and cosmopolitanism has been linked with support for international redistribution. Contrary to the group interests mechanism, the cosmopolitan mechanism predicts that transnational ties are associated with broader support for international redistribution driven by beliefs about moral obligations, rather than by loyalties to a

¹Nye 1971

²Levitt 2001

specific cross-border community.

This article studies the effects of transnational ties on the foreign aid attitudes of the Latino American community. They are one of the largest diaspora communities from the developing world living in a single, developed country. Moreover, Latinos are an increasingly important constituency in American politics with influence on the future direction of U.S. foreign policy. While research in American politics has advanced our understanding of the domestic policy preferences of Latinos, relatively few scholars have investigated Latino attitudes about foreign policy.

I leverage a national survey of 1,000 Latinos fielded in August 2013 that contains original measures of respondents' foreign attachments and a novel embedded experiment designed to test the group interests mechanism and the cosmopolitan mechanism. I find that Latino respondents with transnational ties are significantly more supportive of U.S. foreign aid than respondents without ties. To test whether this result obtains due to group interests or cosmopolitanism, I use the experiment which randomly varies the location of the aid program. The design encourages respondents to think that a U.S. foreign aid program is either in Africa or Latin America and a picture showing recipients of the program reinforces this message. These findings provide evidence in support of the cosmopolitan mechanism: Latinos with transnational ties display high levels of support for both the program in Africa and the program in Latin America. Moreover, Latinos with transnational ties also feel strongly that the U.S. government is morally obligated to help both the Latin American aid recipients and the African aid recipients.

This study contributes to a rich literature in international relations on international migration, diaspora politics, and foreign policy. Scholars have found that ties between domestic and foreign members of a diaspora group can affect a number of foreign policy outcomes of interest.³ These outcomes range from international security outcomes⁴ such as peace and conflict⁵ to international economic outcomes such as trade⁶, investment⁷, exchange rates⁸, and foreign aid⁹. An important way in which scholars suggest diaspora groups can affect foreign policy outcomes is through the mobilization of diaspora group members for policies

³Shain and Barth 2003

⁴Rudolph 2003

⁵Smith 2007

⁶Casella 2002, Greif 1989, Greif 1993, Rauch 2002

⁷Leblang 2010

⁸Singer 2010

⁹Leblang and Bermeo 2012

that benefit their home countries.¹⁰

Yet, the foreign policy preferences of individual members remain relatively understudied or are simply assumed or inferred from foreign policy outcomes. This study helps establish the microfoundations for these findings and suggests that group attachments may not be the only mechanism driving the connection between diasporas and foreign policy outcomes. Moreover, studies that examine the effects of international migration on foreign policy outcomes do so typically by focusing on host and home country dyads. If transnational ties are associated with cosmopolitanism, as my work implies, this suggests that international migration could have effects beyond the dyad.

This paper proceeds in three sections. First, I outline the mechanisms linking transnational ties and support for foreign aid and provide a brief review of the literature on support for international redistribution. Next, I introduce the data and state the hypotheses. The final sections discuss the results and offer a conclusion with steps for future research.

Transnational Ties and Foreign Aid Attitudes: The Mechanisms

Group Interests

The literature on individual preferences for redistribution suggests that there are three main categories of motivations behind redistributive attitudes and behaviors. These categories are self-interest, individual values, and group interests. Yet, to my knowledge only two studies of international redistribution have considered the influence of cross-border group interests on foreign aid outcomes and attitudes. First, Bermeo and Leblang (2012) examine how international migration affects foreign aid outcomes. Their study finds a positive association between the number of migrants in donor country B from recipient country A and foreign aid from donor country B to recipient country A. They demonstrate that the political mobilization of diaspora group members is one of two important mechanisms leading to this result.¹¹ They investigate this mechanism by testing a conditional hypothesis related to migrant voting rights. Although they find that migrant voting rights augment the positive relationship between the size of a migrant population and foreign aid towards that population's home country, this analysis rests on the assumption that individual members of that migrant population support foreign aid directed at their home country. While one could infer this from their analysis, explicitly testing the validity of this assumption would provide

¹⁰Shain 1994

¹¹The other mechanism is donor country interests to prevent additional migration from recipient country A. They find support for this mechanism as well.

more evidence in favor of the mobilization mechanism.¹²

Second, the only research to investigate the effect of social groups on the formation of individual preferences about international redistribution is a study by Baker (2012). He examines the role of racial prejudice and racial paternalism in structuring individual support for foreign aid. His research shows that group interests do not structure White American attitudes towards foreign aid as respondents support aid to a Black-majority country over aid to a White-majority country. Instead of group interests, respondents' attitudes appear to be driven in part by paternalistic impulses motivated by stereotypes of Black foreigners. Despite the mixed findings on the effects of group interests suggested by these two studies, this work takes an important first step in investigating the potential importance of social groups for explaining outcomes and attitudes related to international redistribution.

While there may be a dearth of research on group interests and international redistribution, the literature on group interests and domestic redistribution is vast. It offers numerous studies that demonstrate that group interests can affect redistributive behaviors and outcomes. Experimentally, researchers have shown that individuals are more trusting of and more generous to in-group members. This finding holds for members of ethnic and racial groups for example, as well as when group membership is artificially simulated in a lab setting.¹³ Looking at outcomes, a number of studies have demonstrated that the presence of diverse social groups in a society contributes to lower levels of prosocial activities and policies. For example, in a well-known study on this topic, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) examine differences in welfare state size across developed countries. They argue that differences in the size of the welfare state between the United States and Europe are due in part to the historic diversity of the American population and the homogeneity of European countries. Thus, there is a great deal of evidence that group interests are an important source of incentives for individuals when engaging in redistributive behaviors, but it is unclear the extent to which they structure such behaviors in the international context.

The research linking international migration and international political outcomes more generally, assumes that diaspora group members' foreign policy preferences are structured by group interests as these scholars primarily focus on the effects of diasporas on policies towards and in their homelands. I offer a test of this mechanism by examining whether the

¹²Moreover, when looking at their results by donor country, Bermeo and Leblang find that the relationship between the size of a migrant population and foreign aid does not hold for the United States. They argue that the reason for this exception is due to the strategic focus of American aid policy. My study suggests an alternative explanation: Variation in the strength of transnational ties within the Latino population could affect the willingness of a considerable part of that population to mobilize on behalf of their homeland.

¹³Tajfel 1970, Kramer 1984, Brewer 1985, Gilens 1999, Habyarimana, et al. 2009, Wong 2010

channel through which transnational ties increase support for international redistribution is group-based interests. This theory predicts that as the strength of individuals' attachments to foreign homelands increases, so will their sense of obligation towards their homelands. This feeling of obligation may drive individuals with transnational ties to support redistributive policies that benefit other community members.¹⁴ An implication of this theory is that transnational ties will increase support for international redistribution but only for foreign aid programs that target foreign community members.

Cosmopolitanism

An alternative possibility is that individuals with transnational ties may be supportive of foreign redistribution more broadly as transnational ties may be associated with a cosmopolitan worldview. Political philosophy characterizes cosmopolitanism as a subjective identity in which individuals view themselves as world citizens rather than as members of a particular group. Other scholars have proposed a less stringent definition of a cosmopolitan worldview in which cosmopolitan individuals are defined as simply having worldly interests. A recent essay by Jackman and Vavreck (2011) on cosmopolitanism provides a definition drawn from the work of Robert Merton.¹⁵ Cosmopolitans, they suggest, are individuals who are "more attentive to the world than 'locals' who tend to be oriented toward the local community."¹⁶ They show that individuals with worldly concern have distinct political preferences over candidates and policies from those with more parochial interests. Of direct importance to the research question in this paper, Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit (2014) define cosmopolitanism similarly, also borrowing from Merton's work, and find cosmopolitanism to be one of the best predictors of individual support for international redistribution. Elsewhere in my dissertation, I show that internationalism, a posture closely related to cosmopolitanism, significantly raises support for foreign aid particularly among liberals who are inclined to support redistribution in the domestic context.¹⁷

Although neither cosmopolitanism (as described above) nor transnationalism have distinct and universally accepted definitions,¹⁸ there are compelling reasons to believe that transnational practices like those associated with international migration and maintaining transnational ties can result in a cosmopolitan worldview. Jackman and Vavreck (2011)

¹⁴Wong 2010

¹⁵Merton 1957

¹⁶Jackman and Vavreck 2011, 71

¹⁷Prather 2014

¹⁸Roudometof 2005

note that “[t]here is a widely shared scholarly consensus that cosmopolitanism is largely driven by experience.”¹⁹ In particular, they argue that cosmopolitanism is a byproduct of transnational practices like international travel and communication which lead individuals to interact with others who may be different from themselves. Thus, while it has been assumed that individuals with transnational ties are primarily oriented towards their homelands, transnational experiences may actually foster an interest²⁰ in and an understanding of a broader, more global, range of issues.²¹

If this argument is correct, then we might expect Latinos with transnational ties to have a more cosmopolitan worldview. A cosmopolitan’s greater attention to the world and greater empathy towards people of diverse cultures may lead them to a greater concern for the foreign poor *regardless* of their location. Therefore, Latinos with transnational ties may be supportive of foreign aid more broadly, rather than supporting only those programs that benefit countries or regions where they have personal connections.

Other Predictors of Foreign Aid Preferences

Because this study does not randomly assign transnational ties to individuals, it is important to understand the correlates of support for international redistribution and account for them in the analysis. Like many outcomes in international political economy research, scholars debate whether support for foreign redistribution is driven by material self-interest or individual values. With regards to self-interest, scholars draw on models like the Stolper-Samuelson theorem to suggest that the benefits of international redistribution should accrue according to individual economic endowments. Individuals in developed countries with greater capital endowments (ie. high-skilled individuals) should support foreign aid as they stand to gain from open economic engagement. Scholars find evidence consistent with the self-interest motivation at the individual level using public opinion data²² and by examining legislator

¹⁹Jackman and Vavreck 2011, 72

²⁰For example, in a study of the attitudes of Latino leaders in the United States, Pachon and de la Garza (2000) show that when Latino leaders are asked about their interest in world regions, around half say they are more interested in Latin America, but the rest say they are more interested in other regions or are equally interested in Latin America and other regions. The statistics are not broken down by the strength of these leaders’ ties with their home countries, but the fact that nearly half of Latino leaders in that study expressed equivalent or greater interests in other regions of the world suggests the possibility that diaspora group members may have a more cosmopolitan worldview than previously assumed. Moreover, Helbling and Teney (2014) argue that the effects of transnational activities on cosmopolitan attitudes are potentially even stronger among the masses than among the elite.

²¹Mau, Mewes, and Zimmerman 2008

²²Paxton and Knack 2012

support for foreign redistributive programs.²³

While there is evidence in favor of the self-interest explanation, scholars have also shown that values-based theories have explanatory power. If material self-interest is at one end of the spectrum, then altruism – the idea that individuals should help others without expecting anything in return – is at the other end. Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit (2014) find that a quasi-behavioral measure of altruism (donation to a charity) is strongly correlated with support for international redistribution. In their paper, they also provide convincing evidence against the self-interest explanation. They join a number of other studies that highlight the importance of non-material determinants of foreign aid support. Some of these include ideology²⁴, morality²⁵, and religiosity²⁶. These studies suggest that accounting for self-interest through a proxy such as income and for non-material interests such as ideology and religiosity may be important if these characteristics are also associated with transnational ties. The next section details the research strategy for adjudicating between the group interests and cosmopolitan mechanisms while taking into consideration the other correlates of individual foreign aid preferences.

Data and Hypotheses

To investigate the relationship between transnational ties and support for international redistribution, I use individual-level data from a survey fielded in the United States to a national sample of 1,000 Latino respondents. The Latino community in the United States is an important population to study for this research question for three key reasons. First, the Latino American community is growing and the Latino electorate is becoming more influential. Understanding Latino attitudes on foreign policy, which have been relatively understudied to this date, provides insight into the future direction of U.S. foreign policy. Second, Latinos represent a community with important variation in transnational ties and scholars have argued that this variation is key to understanding the determinants of Latino transnational political behavior and attitudes.²⁷ Finally, while the theory laid out above regarding the relationship between transnational ties and support for international redistribution is rather general, it is likely that it applies most to individuals living in foreign aid donor countries with transnational ties to the developing world. Thus, the Latino American

²³Milner and Tingley 2010, Milner and Tingley 2011

²⁴Noel and Therien 2000

²⁵van Heerde and Hudson 2010

²⁶Paxton and Knack 2012

²⁷Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003

community represents an ideal population with which to begin exploring this relationship.

I use a survey fielded in August 2013 to an online sample of 1,000 Latino American respondents. The survey was administered in English using YouGov's online survey platform. It contained a number of questions measuring both demographic characteristics of the respondents and political attitudes. The questions were fielded as a part of the omnibus instrument of the Laboratory for the Study of American Values at Stanford University.

Measuring Transnational Ties


The main independent variable in this study – transnational ties – distinguishes between three mutually exclusive levels of transnational ties using three different measures. These measures are binary indicators for whether or not a respondent was born abroad, sends remittances abroad or has close friends and family abroad. I code a respondent as having no transnational ties if they meet the following three conditions: 1) they were born in the United States; 2) they do not send remittances; 3) they do not have any close friends or family living abroad.²⁸ Thirty-nine percent of the Latinos in my sample have no transnational ties.

Among respondents with some transnational ties, I differentiate between those with stronger, more costly ties and those with weaker ties. I code a respondent as having strong transnational ties (about thirty-five percent of the sample) if they meet either of the following conditions: 1) they were born in a foreign country (first generation immigrant) or 2) they send remittances. First generation immigrants are the most likely of any generational group in my sample to have strong connections abroad. More than eighty percent of the first generation immigrants report having close friends or family abroad and half say they send money abroad to help them. Remittances, however, are a costly form of transnational ties for individuals regardless of generational status (and are themselves a form of private international redistribution). Therefore, respondents who send remittances abroad, but are beyond first generation immigrants are also coded as having strong ties. Finally, I code a respondent as having weak transnational ties if they meet the following three conditions: 1) they were born in the United States; 2) they do not send remittances; 3) they have close friends or family living abroad. This category of respondents represents twenty-six percent of my sample. Figure 1 depicts these coding decisions graphically.

I validate my measure of transnational ties using the self-reported Spanish speaking ability of respondents – a trait we would also expect to be associated with the strength

²⁸Although respondents who said they do not have any close friends or family abroad were still allowed to answer the question about remittance behavior, only one percent of respondents said they sent money abroad when they did not respond affirmatively to the friends or family question.

Figure 1: Coding Transnational Ties



of transnational ties. I find a significant, nearly monotonic, twenty-four percentage point increase across each level of ties in the percentage of respondents reporting that they speak Spanish well. Forty-one percent of respondents with no ties claim to speak Spanish well. Sixty-four percent of respondents with weak ties say they speak Spanish well. Respondents in the strong ties category are the most proficient Spanish speakers with eighty-eight percent noting their high level of Spanish-speaking ability.

Experimental Design

To examine how transnational ties affect support for international redistribution, I construct an experiment that is embedded in the survey. In the experiment, respondents read a fictional news article about a U.S. government program that they are told U.S. officials might cut. The

news article contains two independently randomized treatments for a 2x2 factorial design. The first treatment (*Foreign*) varies whether the government program is a foreign assistance program or a domestic assistance program. I use a second treatment (*Latino*) to test whether support for the foreign program is higher among Latinos with transnational ties due to cross-border group interests or cosmopolitanism. The *Latino* treatment varies the location of the recipients of the aid program. In the news article, the location of the aid program is described as either targeting countries in Africa or countries in Latin America and a picture associated with the news article reinforces this treatment.²⁹

The news article also contains additional information about the program that is held constant across conditions. Respondents read that the program costs the U.S. government \$100 million and provides food packages to 150,000 people living below the poverty line. These constant items are included in order to control for any bias associated with misinformation about how much the program costs and how many people receive help from it. Hunger relief is specified as the type of redistribution as it is typically one of the least controversial types of assistance. At the end of the news article, respondents read that officials hope to make a decision about the program soon. After reading the news article, I ask respondents whether they think the officials should cut the program or should not cut the program. The responses to this question serve as my dependent variable.

While the focus of this paper is on support for international redistribution, I include a domestic redistribution condition as previous research suggests that a respondent's degree of acculturation in their host country may affect a number of domestic redistributive preferences. For example, in one study of Latino preferences, Branton (2007) finds that "less acculturated Latinos [measured by generational status] are more likely to support policy positions that distribute benefits to immigrants, the needy, and minority groups in general than when compared to "fully" acculturated Latinos."³⁰ Although this finding suggests support for the cosmopolitan mechanism, as respondents with transnational ties are more likely to support aid to domestic minority groups generally, it also indicates that any relationship I discover between transnational ties and support for international redistribution may simply be due to underlying differences in a taste for redistribution between those with transnational ties and those without. To demonstrate that this effect is not a byproduct of different tastes for redistribution generally across varying levels of transnational ties, I examine support for the domestic assistance program as well. Support for the domestic program should be similar

²⁹See the Appendix for the experimental vignette and example of YouGov instrument.

³⁰Branton 2007, 301

across groups to rule out the redistributive tastes argument.

Hypotheses

I use this data to test three main hypotheses. First, I expect support for the foreign aid program to be strongest among Latinos with transnational ties and weakest among Latinos with no transnational ties (H1). The second and third hypotheses relate to the mechanism behind the effect. I investigate the group interests mechanism using the *Latino* treatment. If the group interests mechanism is correct, then we should see that the positive correlation between transnational ties and support for international redistribution is driven primarily by respondents in the Latin America condition. That is to say, the relationship between transnational ties and support for international redistribution should be conditional on treatment assignment in the *Latino* treatment (H2). If, on the other hand, the cosmopolitan mechanism is true, we should see equal levels of support among those with transnational ties for the program targeting foreign recipients in Africa as we do for the program targeting foreign recipients in Latin America (H3).

Results

To test hypothesis H1, I first examine the distribution of support for the foreign aid program at each level of transnational ties. 55.1% of respondents with no transnational ties said not to cut the foreign aid program and that percentage increases significantly across each level of transnational ties. Among those with ties, 66.4% of respondents with weak ties support the foreign aid program and 74.7% of respondents with strong ties support the program. This increase across each level of ties is nearly monotonic and quite strong, with almost a ten percentage point increase moving from no ties across weak and strong ties.

Because the transnational ties measure is observed, however, and not experimentally manipulated, I also estimate probit regression models of the dependent variable that include a number of covariates to control for demographic characteristics of respondents that could be associated with both transnational ties and support for foreign aid. In these models, *Aid Support* is coded 1 if the respondent said not to cut the program and is coded 0 if the respondent said to cut the program.³¹ The *Ties* variable is coded 0 if the respondent

³¹A question that followed the dependent variable asked respondents how strongly they felt about the officials cutting or keeping the program. This question had four categories and from it an eight-category dependent variable was also created. The results do not change using this measure and thus the more simple binary dependent variable is used throughout the article.


has no ties, 1 if the respondent has weak ties, and 2 if the respondent has strong ties. *Aid Support* is regressed on *Ties*, the *Foreign* treatment, and an interaction term between *Ties* and *Foreign*. In all models with control variables, the control variables include a binary indicator for gender (*Woman*), a continuous variable for *Age*, *Education* (six categories), a binary indicator for household *Income* less than \$30,000, a binary indicator for full-time *Employment*, a binary indicator for *Republican* party affiliation, a binary indicator for race (*White*), a four-category measure of trust in government (*GovTrust*), and a four-category measure of *Religiosity*.

The results confirm what we see in the raw distribution: Respondents with strong transnational ties are significantly more supportive of the foreign aid program than those without transnational ties. Table 1 holds the coefficients from the probit model and Figure 2 plots the predicted probabilities from Model 2 of supporting the aid program at each value of *Ties* for respondents in the domestic and foreign treatment conditions. As can be seen from the figure, there is a significant increase in support for the foreign aid program across the different categories of ties – as the strength of respondents’ ties increases so does support for the foreign aid program. While the probability of supporting the foreign aid program among respondents with weak ties is not significantly different from the other two categories, the difference in support between those respondents with strong ties and those with no ties is statistically significant and substantively quite large. Respondents with strong transnational ties have a significantly higher probability of supporting foreign aid than those with no with no transnational ties. These results provide support for H1 that transnational ties increase support for international redistribution.

Moreover, as can be seen in Figure 2 there is no significant difference in support for the domestic program across the different categories of *Ties*. If anything, there is a slight decrease in support for the domestic program across the strength of transnational ties as respondents with strong transnational ties are slightly less supportive of the domestic program. These results suggest that the effect of transnational ties on support for international redistribution does not seem to be driven by a difference in redistributive tastes across the three categories. Furthermore, these results reflect a pattern identified in other work in which I show that individuals who support redistribution in the domestic context do not necessarily support it in the international context.³² It is clear from the figure that across all levels of transnational ties, Latinos have extremely high support for domestic redistribution. Support for the international aid program only reaches the same level of support as the

³²Prather 2014

Figure 2



domestic program among individuals with strong ties. This suggests that transnational ties may be a key determinant of individuals' placement along the isolationist/internationalist spectrum – a disposition that I argue governs the extent to which individuals externalize domestic redistributive values to the international context.


Mechanisms

To test whether the relationship between transnational ties and support for foreign aid is due to group interests (H2) or cosmopolitanism (H3), I restrict the sample to those in the foreign aid condition. I estimate a probit regression model of *Aid Support* regressed on the binary indicator for the *Latino* treatment, *Ties*, and the interaction between *Latino* and *Ties*. I continue to include control variables to account for any bias associated with underlying demographic traits that are correlated with transnational ties and support for redistribution.

The results of the probit regression model can be found in Table 2 and Figure 3 graphically displays the predicted probabilities from Model 2 at each level of ties for respondents in the Africa and Latin America aid conditions. These results indicate support for the cosmopolitan mechanism. The effect of *Ties* on support for foreign aid is positive and significant at the .05 level and there is no interaction between *Ties* and the *Latino* treatment. In other words, respondents' support for foreign aid is not conditional on the location of the aid program. This can be seen clearly in Figure 3.

To further understand the mechanisms behind the relationship between transnational

Figure 3



ties and support for foreign aid, I examine the effect of *Ties* on two follow-up questions asked to respondents. The first question asks if respondents feel that the U.S. government has a moral obligation to help the recipients of the program. If the cosmopolitan mechanism is correct we would expect respondents to believe the U.S. government has an equal moral obligation to help the African aid recipients and the Latin American aid recipients. The question appeared as follows:


- *Morality*: Do you agree or disagree that the U.S. government has a moral obligation to assist the recipients of this program? Strongly disagree - Strongly agree (4-categories)

I estimate an OLS model of *Morality* regressed on *Ties*, *Latino*, *Ties*Latino*, and the vector of control variables. Results from these models are in Table 3. Figure 4 holds the predicted values of *Morality* from Model 2 at each level of ties for those in the Africa and Latin America aid condition.

I find that the effect of *Ties* on belief that the government is morally obligated to assist the recipients of the program is positive and significant at the 0.1 level. These beliefs do not appear to be conditional on the location of the aid program. There is no significant interaction between *Ties* and the *Latino* treatment. More concretely, it appears that as the strength of a respondent's transnational ties increases so do their beliefs that the government has a moral duty to help the foreign poor *regardless* of the recipients' location.

A second question helps us understand if individuals with transnational ties are more likely to view the foreign aid recipients as members of their in-group. I measure in-group

Figure 4



using a question from previous research by Wong (2010) who uses this question to measure the social groups with which individuals identify. The question is as follows.

- *In-Group*: How close do you feel, in terms of your ideas and interests, to the recipients of this program? Not at all close - Very close (4-categories)

I estimate OLS models of *In-Group* regressed on *Ties* and the vector of control variables for both the respondents in the Africa aid treatment group and those in the Latin America treatment group. Results from these models are in Table 4. Comparing the relationship between *Ties* and *In-Group* in the two models reveals that *Ties* is only significantly correlated with *In-Group* among those in the Latin America treatment.³³ Latinos with strong transnational ties are significantly more likely to say they share ideas and interests with the Latin American aid recipients than are Latinos with no transnational ties. There is no such relationship in the Africa aid condition. Latinos with strong transnational ties are only slightly more likely to express common interests and ideas with the African aid recipients.

The results from these analyses provide evidence in favor of H1 and H3. The first set of findings demonstrate that as the strength of Latinos' foreign attachments increases so does their support for foreign aid. Although they are more supportive of foreign aid, Latinos

³³ *Ties* is significantly correlated with *In-Group* among those in the Africa aid condition only in the model without control variables. Once the control variables are added, the significance of the effect goes away. Regardless, the magnitude of the effect is substantially smaller than the effect of *Ties* among Latinos in the Latin American condition.

with strong transnational ties do not seem to be more supportive of domestic redistribution as previous research has suggested.³⁴ Rather transnational ties only seem to raise Latino support for the foreign aid program.

Turning to mechanisms, I argued that prior research assumes this effect is driven by group-based interests and proposed an alternative theory, that the transnational practices associated with international migration and maintaining personal connections abroad could result in a cosmopolitan worldview. I hypothesized that these two mechanisms lead to different observable implications about whether or not the link between transnational ties and support for foreign aid is conditional on the location of the foreign aid recipients. The results presented above provide evidence for the cosmopolitan mechanism. Rather than finding that transnational ties only affect support for foreign aid when the aid benefits recipients in Latin America (H2, the group interests mechanism), I find support for the cosmopolitan mechanism (H3), that transnational ties increase support for foreign aid to both Africa and Latin America.

Finally, examining how *Ties* relates to beliefs about the moral obligations of the U.S. government (*Morality*) and beliefs about shared identity (*In-Group*) suggest that although Latinos with strong ties are more likely to identify the Latin American aid recipients as members of their in-group than the African aid recipients, this does not translate into a stronger desire for aid to Latin America. This is perhaps the strongest evidence of all in favor of the cosmopolitan mechanism over the group interests mechanism because, despite not identifying with the African recipients, Latinos with strong transnational ties still believe strongly that the U.S. government has a moral obligation to help them.

Robustness

One critique that could be made about drawing these conclusions from the results of this experiment is that the *Latino* treatment, which manipulated the location of the aid program, was potentially too weak. This could result from two possible experimental design flaws. The first is that the location treatment was perhaps not visible enough to respondents and was thus not received. Finding no difference in support for aid across the treatment conditions would then purely be a function of experimental design rather than an indication of a cosmopolitan worldview. The second design flaw that could lead to a weak treatment is that the treatment was not precise enough to prime group interests. While the treatment stated that the aid program would help countries in Latin America, it did not specify which

³⁴Branton 2007

country in Latin America would receive aid or even better, condition the country on the respondent's national or ancestral origin. Thus, it is possible that respondents with transnational ties would have been more supportive of foreign aid to the Latin American recipients than the African recipients if the Latin American recipients had been described as living in respondents' home countries.

While the findings related to *In-Group* suggest that the treatment was received and was strong enough such that Latinos with transnational ties were more likely to view the Latin American aid recipients as members of their in-group, I offer here an additional analyses to address these concerns. This robustness check examines the moderating effect of respondents' Latino group consciousness on the relationship between transnational ties and support for foreign aid. If the treatment was too weak because it was not received then we should see no difference across the Africa and Latin America aid conditions in the moderating effect of Latino group consciousness on the relationship between transnational ties and support for foreign aid. If the treatment was received but is too weak because the respondent's home country was not specifically described as a beneficiary of the aid program, then we might expect for Latino group consciousness to moderate the effect of transnational ties on support for foreign aid among respondents in the Latin America condition. Why might this be so?

First, it is necessary to briefly discuss group consciousness and how it is measured. Group consciousness among Latinos refers to the extent to which a Latino American identifies with Latinos as a group rather than or in addition to those individuals who share her ethnic or national ancestry. Previous research suggests that individuals with high levels of group consciousness are more likely to have political preferences structured by group-based interests.³⁵ One of the key ways group consciousness is measured is by examining individual beliefs about linked fate.³⁶ Linked fate captures the extent to which a respondent believes her well being depends on others in her social group doing well.

I can use respondents' beliefs about linked fate to examine the critique that the treatment is too weak because I did not manipulate the aid recipients' home country. Although I cannot invalidate the idea that group interests might be primed more strongly with home country, I can examine whether group interests are more strongly primed by the home *region* among those with high levels of Latino group consciousness. If the weak treatment critique is valid, I expect the relationship between transnational ties and support for foreign aid to be conditional on high levels of Latino group consciousness. Specifically, the relationship

³⁵Dawson 1995


³⁶Ibid.

between transnational ties and support for foreign aid to Latin America should be much weaker among those with low levels of Latino group consciousness and much stronger among those with high levels of group consciousness.

To test this hypothesis, I use a measure of linked fate which has been used in previous research to study Latino group consciousness.³⁷ The question asks respondents the extent to which how well they are personally doing depends on how well other Latinos are doing. I create a measure called *Linked Fate* and code respondents as having high group consciousness (1) if they answered “some” or “a lot” to this question (around forty-one percent of the sample). I code respondents as having low group consciousness (0) if they answered “a little” or “not at all” (around fifty-nine percent of the sample).

Table 5 holds the results from the probit regression models of *Aid Support* regressed on *Ties*, *Linked Fate*, *Ties * Linked Fate*, and the control variables. I also estimate the predicted probability of supporting the aid program at each level of ties for respondents with low and high Latino group consciousness. These are presented graphically in Figure 5 for those in the Africa aid condition and Figure 6 for those in the Latin America aid condition.


Figure 5



The findings from this analysis provide further evidence that the critique that the treatment was too weak is invalid. The moderating effect of group consciousness is conditional on the treatment condition of the respondent. While respondents with high levels of Latino group consciousness are slightly more supportive of aid to Africa at each level of transna-

³⁷Masouka 2006

Figure 6



tional ties, the strength of the relationship is quite similar for both respondents with high levels of group consciousness and those with low levels of group consciousness. This makes sense as there is very little reason to suspect that the linked fate respondents feel to other Latinos should affect their support for foreign aid to Africa.

On the other hand, Latino group consciousness significantly moderates the relationship between transnational ties and support for foreign aid to Latin America. As noted above, I hypothesized that because the treatment stated rather generally that the foreign aid program helped countries in Latin America, only respondents who felt a sense of Latino group consciousness might be primed to think in terms of group interests. Thus, we might see a weak positive correlation between transnational ties and support for foreign aid among those with low group consciousness and a much stronger relationship between transnational ties and support for foreign aid to Latin America among those with high levels of group consciousness. Surprisingly, I find the reverse.

In Figure 6, one can see that support for foreign aid to Latin America is high *regardless* of the strength of the respondent's ties among respondents with high levels of group consciousness. In other words, even respondents with no transnational ties are highly supportive of foreign aid to Latin America if they have high Latino group consciousness. Among respondents with low group consciousness on the other hand, transnational ties have a significant and positive effect on support for foreign aid to Latin America, which suggests that in fact the treatment was not too weak.

Thus, it appears that group interests do have a role to play, but that role is not as a mechanism driving the effect of transnational ties on support for foreign aid. Instead, these results suggest that when transnational ties are absent, group consciousness can act as a substitute for personal ties abroad and lift support for foreign aid benefitting foreign group members. Transnational ties then close the gap in support for foreign aid to Latin America between Latinos with low group consciousness and those with high group consciousness.

Conclusion

This article investigates how transnational ties affect individual support for international redistribution. It proposes and tests two mechanisms behind the effect – group interests and cosmopolitanism. The evidence presented here suggests support for the latter mechanism: Transnational ties increase support for international redistribution broadly rather than to members of a specific cross-border community.

The evidence for the cosmopolitan mechanism is robust. First, I find in a survey of Latino respondents that those with transnational ties support an aid program assisting African recipients at a similar rate to one assisting recipients in Latin America. Moreover, respondents believe that the U.S. government has an equivalent moral obligation towards recipients of both aid programs even though they are more likely to identify with the Latin American recipients. Finally, I provide a robustness check that suggests these results are not due to a weak treatment effect.

These findings encourage future work on this topic. First, future research could examine the relationship between transnational ties and cosmopolitanism directly in addition to investigating the observable implication tested here. Measuring cosmopolitanism is not an easy task as the literature offers a range of definitions and potential operationalizations. Nevertheless, it would provide more direct evidence in favor of the cosmopolitan mechanism proposed here. Second, while these results provide a starting point for examining the relationship between transnational ties and support for international redistribution, they are limited to a study of Latino respondents in the United States. Although Latinos are an important group to study, characteristics of the Latino population might limit the generalizability of the results to other populations with transnational ties. For example, it may be that Latinos are particularly cosmopolitan, while other diaspora populations may be more prone to parochialism. Replicating this study among other diaspora groups and other populations is outside the scope of this article, but should be pursued in future work to further understand the theories outlined herein.

Although there is more work to be done, these findings alone have implications for how scholars study the impact of globalization and international migration. First, they demonstrate that there is a link between transnational practices and cosmopolitanism. While this link has been examined in a general population³⁸, this study encourages scholars to investigate how the transnational practices of immigrants might also lead to a cosmopolitan worldview. Indeed as immigration continues to increase it will be important to understand how transnational connections affect the foreign policy preferences of individuals in these communities.

Second, it is surprising given the importance of the Latino American community that this is one of the first studies to rigorously investigate the foreign policy preferences of Latino Americans. To the extent that these studies exist, they primarily examine the preferences of Latinos for policies that affect their homelands.³⁹ Importantly, my study investigates the preferences of Latino respondents for policies beyond those that affect their homelands exclusively. This allows me to not only test the group interests mechanism that is assumed in much of the diaspora politics literature but to also discover a broader range of foreign policy attitudes. Indeed, the literature on Latino political behavior in the domestic context has investigated a range of policy preferences beyond just those that are thought to affect the Latino American community. Thus, it makes sense for scholars to investigate their foreign policy preferences in the same way.

Finally, this article makes a contribution to our understanding of the future direction of foreign policy in the United States. The findings indicate that as more individuals are able to maintain transnational ties to other countries, we may see an increase in support for foreign aid programs in the United States, a country in which foreign aid has historically been among the least supported programs.

³⁸Helbling and Teney 2014

³⁹e.g. Pachon and de la Garza 2000

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Appendix

Tables

Table 1: Probit Models of Aid Support

	Model 1	Model 2
Foreign	-1.01*** (0.137)	-1.06*** (0.140)
Ties	-0.15* (0.081)	-0.17** (0.083)
Foreign*Ties	0.42*** (0.105)	0.43*** (0.107)
Latino	0.09 (0.088)	0.10 (0.090)
Constant	1.09*** (0.115)	1.14*** (0.260)
Controls	No	Yes
Observations	1,000	1,000
Pseudo R2	0.06	0.10
Log likelihood	-536.69	-515.45

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: The table reports the probit coefficient estimates of the models of *Aid Support*. The dependent variable is a binary indicator coded 1 if respondents said officials should not cut the aid program and coded 0 if respondents said officials should cut the aid program. The Foreign variable captures treatment assignment in which individuals are randomly assigned to read about a domestic aid program (0) or a foreign aid program (1). Latino is a variable that captures treatment assignment in which individuals are randomly assigned to read that the program helps Latinos or people in Latin America (1) or to read that the program helps African-Americans or people in Africa (0). The model with control variables includes Age, Gender, Education, Income, Employment, Race, Party, Trust in Government and Religiosity. Heteroskedastic - consistent robust standard errors are in parentheses. All results are unweighted.

Table 2: Probit Models of Foreign Aid Support

	Model 1	Model 2
Latino	0.09 (0.169)	0.11 (0.173)
Ties	0.26*** (0.100)	0.23** (0.103)
Latino*Ties	0.03 (0.136)	0.00 (0.139)
Constant	0.09 (0.124)	-0.03 (0.322)
Controls	No	Yes
Observations	507	507
Pseudo R2	0.03	0.07
Log likelihood	-320.05	-307.23

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: The table reports the probit coefficient estimates of the models of *Aid Support*. The dependent variable is a binary indicator coded 1 if respondents said officials should not cut the aid program and coded 0 if respondents said officials should cut the aid program. Latino is a variable that captures treatment assignment in which individuals are randomly assigned to read that the program helps people in Latin America (1) or to read that the program helps people in Africa (0). The model with control variables includes Age, Gender, Education, Income, Employment, Race, Party, Trust in Government and Religiosity. Heteroskedastic - consistent robust standard errors are in parentheses. All results are unweighted.

Table 3: OLS Model of Morality

	Model 1	Model 2
Latino	0.03 (0.127)	0.03 (0.125)
Ties	0.20*** (0.076)	0.14* (0.077)
Latino*Ties	-0.04 (0.098)	-0.04 (0.097)
Constant	2.57*** (0.096)	2.14*** (0.228)
Controls	No	Yes
Observations	507	507
R2	0.03	0.07

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: The table reports the OLS coefficient estimates of the models of *Morality*. *Morality* has four categories taking values 1-4 with higher values corresponding to stronger agreement with the statement that the U.S. government has a moral obligation to help the recipients of the foreign aid program. Latino is a variable that captures treatment assignment in which individuals are randomly assigned to read that the program helps people in Latin America (1) or to read that the program helps people in Africa (0). The model with control variables includes Age, Gender, Education, Income, Employment, Race, Party, Trust in Government and Religiosity. Heteroskedastic - consistent robust standard errors are in parentheses. All results are unweighted.

Table 4: OLS Models of In-Group

	Africa 1	Africa 2	Latino 1	Latino 2
Ties	0.16** (0.074)	0.10 (0.078)	0.29*** (0.059)	0.25*** (0.064)
Constant	2.46*** (0.096)	1.51*** (0.305)	2.26*** (0.082)	1.94*** (0.293)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	230	230	276	276
R2	0.02	0.10	0.08	0.14

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: The table reports the OLS coefficient estimates of the models of *In-Group*. *In-Group* has four categories taking values 1-4 with higher values corresponding to stronger feelings of shared identity with the foreign aid recipients. The models with control variables includes Age, Gender, Education, Income, Employment, Race, Party, Trust in Government and Religiosity. Heteroskedastic - consistent robust standard errors are in parentheses. All results are unweighted.

Table 5: Probit Models of Aid Support

	Africa 1	Africa 2	Latino 1	Latino 2
Ties	0.26** (0.129)	0.18 (0.142)	0.42*** (0.132)	0.44*** (0.141)
Linked Fate	0.43 (0.265)	0.30 (0.285)	0.71*** (0.248)	0.76*** (0.262)
Ties * Linked Fate	-0.07 (0.207)	-0.04 (0.221)	-0.36* (0.192)	-0.42** (0.200)
Constant	-0.06 (0.154)	-0.41 (0.455)	-0.08 (0.146)	-0.04 (0.492)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	231	231	276	276
Pseudo R2	0.04	0.12	0.05	0.09
Log likelihood	-146.92	-134.17	-166.67	-159.04

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: The table reports the probit coefficient estimates of the models of *Aid Support*. The dependent variable is a binary indicator coded 1 if respondents said officials should not cut the aid program and coded 0 if respondents said officials should cut the aid program. The models with control variables includes Age, Gender, Education, Income, Employment, Race, Party, Trust in Government and Religiosity. Heteroskedastic - consistent robust standard errors are in parentheses. All results are unweighted.

Experimental Vignette

News Article With Randomizations

U.S. Officials May Cut Hunger Relief Program

Program Gives Food To The Poor In [**The United States** / **Other Countries**]

WASHINGTON, D.C. –U.S. government officials are considering cutting a government hunger relief program. It assists 150,000 people living below the poverty line in [**the United States** / **other countries**]. Through the program, the U.S. government distributes food packages to program recipients. It costs the U.S. government \$100 million each year. Officials hope to reach a decision about the program soon.



OR



People at program distribution center in [**Pennsylvania** / **New Mexico** / **Africa** / **Latin America**]. Photo: AGP news

Do you think U.S. officials should cut the program, or should not cut the program?

- 0 Should cut the program.
1 Should not cut the program.

YouGov Screenshot Example

U.S. Officials May Cut Government Hunger Relief Program

Program Gives Food To The Poor In Other Countries

WASHINGTON, D.C. - U.S. government officials are considering cutting a government hunger relief program. It assists 150,000 people living below the poverty line in other countries. Through the program, the U.S. government distributes food packages to program recipients. It costs the U.S. government \$100 million each year. Officials hope to reach a decision about the program soon.



People at program distribution center in Latin America. Photo: AGP news