

Transnational Ties and Support for Foreign Aid

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Although globalization and international migration have increased personal connections across national borders, we know little about how these connections affect attitudes toward foreign policy. This study examines how transnational ties affect support for foreign aid in donor countries. It argues that transnational ties increase support for foreign aid via two mechanisms: group interests and cosmopolitanism. An original survey experiment embedded in a national survey of one thousand Latino Americans shows that Latinos vary significantly in the strength of their transnational ties, which is strongly correlated with support for foreign aid. The findings from the experiment, which varies the location of an American foreign aid program, demonstrate that, although group interests explain some of this effect, cosmopolitanism is also an important mechanism. Indeed, Latinos with transnational ties equally support aid to Africa and Latin America. A test of the generalizability of the findings to other racial and ethnic groups in the United States and United Kingdom reveal that group interests may be a more powerful mechanism outside of the Latino American community. This study encourages further work on the relationship between transnational ties and foreign policy attitudes and provides insight into the emerging link between international migration and foreign aid.

In Nye and Keohane's collection on transnational politics, scholars identify a range of institutions through which individuals can maintain relationships across national borders such as multinational corporations, religious organizations, and activist groups (Nye and Keohane 1971). More recently, as countries and people have become more connected through transnational processes such as globalization and international migration, researchers have started thinking about the relationships that exist outside of these institutional structures such as those in transnational social networks. Individuals in transnational social networks maintain these connections abroad through a variety of transnational practices. These practices are made easier with the ease of modern communication and international travel (Levitt 2001). Today, someone who was born abroad or who has friends or family living abroad can connect with others in their transnational social networks fairly easily and at a relatively low cost just by picking up the phone or clicking a button.

What are the effects of transnational ties on individual support for foreign policy? In this article, I examine the role of transnational ties in shaping support for foreign aid in donor countries. I develop a theory that argues that transnational ties raise support for foreign aid via two possible mechanisms. The first mechanism is group interests. Prior research in international relations suggests that group attachments shape foreign policy preferences, such as those toward war (e.g., Berinsky 2009) and even private forms of foreign assistance (Desai and Kharas 2018). Furthermore, the literature on group interests and the welfare state suggests that group ties are a powerful determinant of support for redistribution in the domestic context (e.g., Alesina and Glaeser 2004). Thus, I hypothesize that transnational ties between individuals in a cross-border community may raise support for international redistribution in the form

of foreign aid policy toward that community, but not more broadly.

Beyond group interests, I argue that an additional mechanism—the cosmopolitan mechanism—may also lead individuals with transnational ties to have greater support for foreign aid. Drawing on the transnationalism and cosmopolitanism literatures, I hypothesize that transnational ties may be associated with a cosmopolitan worldview—having worldly interests over parochial ones. Past research has found a relationship between transnational practices and cosmopolitanism (Mau, Mewes, and Zimmermann 2008), and cosmopolitanism has been linked with support for international redistribution (Bechtel, Hainmueller, and Margalit 2014). Contrary to the group interests mechanism, the cosmopolitan mechanism predicts that transnational ties are associated with broader support for foreign aid driven by beliefs about moral obligations to humanity more broadly, rather than by loyalties to a specific cross-border community.

To test this theory and its generalizability, I fielded three original surveys with embedded experiments in the United States and the United Kingdom. This article focuses first on identifying the effects of transnational ties on the foreign aid attitudes of the Latino American community. Latinos are one of the largest diaspora communities from the developing world living in a single, developed country. Moreover, Latinos are an increasingly important constituency in American politics with influence on the future direction of US foreign policy. While research in American politics has advanced our understanding of the domestic policy preferences of Latinos, this is one of the first studies to investigate Latino attitudes about foreign policy.

The primary source of data in this study is a national survey of 1,000 Latinos fielded in August 2013 that contains original measures of respondents' foreign attachments and a novel embedded experiment designed to test the group interests mechanism and the cosmopolitan mechanism. I find that Latino respondents with transnational ties are significantly more supportive of US foreign aid than respondents without ties. I explore the group interests and cosmopolitanism hypotheses using an experiment that randomly varies the location of the aid program. The

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design encourages respondents to think that a US foreign aid program is located either in Africa or Latin America, and a picture showing recipients of the program reinforces this message. The findings provide evidence for both the group interests and cosmopolitan mechanisms: Latinos with transnational ties display high levels of support for both the program in Africa and the program in Latin America. Moreover, Latinos with transnational ties also feel strongly that the US government is morally obligated to help both the Latin American aid recipients and the African aid recipients. I examine the generalizability of these findings to other racial and ethnic groups using original surveys fielded in the United States and United Kingdom to diverse national samples that include respondents from a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds.

This study contributes to a rich literature in international relations on international migration, diaspora politics, and foreign policy. Scholars have found that ties between domestic and foreign members of a diaspora group can affect a number of foreign policy outcomes of interest (Shain and Barth 2003). These outcomes range from international security outcomes (Rudolph 2003) such as peace and conflict (Smith and Stares 2007) to international economic outcomes such as trade (Casella and Rauch 2002; Greif 1989, 1993; Rauch and Trindade 2002), investment (Leblang 2010), exchange rates (Singer 2010), economic sanctions (Rubenzer and Redd 2010), and foreign aid (Bermeo and Leblang 2015). An important way in which scholars suggest diaspora groups can affect foreign policy outcomes is through the mobilization of diaspora group members for policies that benefit their home countries (Shain 1994).

Yet, the foreign policy preferences of individual members of these communities remain relatively understudied or are simply assumed or inferred from foreign policy outcomes. Problematically, these studies tend to assume diaspora members care exclusively about members of their cross-border community. This study interrogates that assumption theorizing about additional mechanisms and policy attitudes beyond the typical group interests theory. It therefore helps establish the microfoundations for these findings and demonstrates that group attachments are not the only mechanism driving the connection between diasporas and foreign policy outcomes. Finally, studies that examine the effects of international migration on foreign policy outcomes do so typically by focusing on host and home country dyads. If transnational ties are associated with cosmopolitanism, as some of the findings in this article imply, this suggests that international migration could have effects beyond the dyad.

A Model of Transnational Ties and Foreign Aid Attitudes

Although the emerging literature on migration and foreign aid has made progress documenting the relationship between the two at the country level (Bermeo and Leblang 2015; Gamso and Yuldashev 2018), this article focuses on the individual level, specifying the microfoundations linking migration and foreign aid. Specifically, I first identify a source of variation in diaspora communities: the strength of their ties with their home countries and regions. Then, I outline the mechanisms linking the strength of transnational ties to support for foreign aid.

First, what are transnational ties and why are they important? By transnational ties, I refer to the personal connections individuals have to foreign countries and regions. One of the primary ways in which individuals in donor countries have ties to foreign countries and regions in the developing world is through international migration. According to

United Nations Population Facts, “[f]rom 1990 to 2013, the number of international migrants born in the South and residing in the North doubled, increasing from 40 to 82 million and growing more than twice as fast as the global total [of migrants].” Thus, the number of individuals residing in foreign aid donor countries from potential recipient countries is substantial and growing.

Moreover, many of the individuals moving from South to North engage in international redistribution themselves. Indeed, according to the World Bank, the money sent from international migrants to developing countries is expected to rise to \$516 billion dollars in 2016, far outpacing official development assistance provided by foreign aid donors.¹ If many of the individuals in donor countries with transnational ties are already engaging in international redistribution themselves, then it may follow that they are also an important constituency in favor of government foreign aid policies.

Below I hypothesize two causal pathways that would lead individuals with transnational ties to have greater support for foreign aid than individuals without ties. The first pathway aligns with conventional assumptions in the literature about diaspora members. The assumption is that individuals with transnational ties will be more likely to identify with a cross-border community than those without ties, and identifying with this community will increase support for foreign aid to that community, but not more broadly. I argue, however, that there is a second pathway, which draws on the positive relationship between transnational ties and cosmopolitanism, a predisposition that scholars have also found to be a good predictor of support for foreign aid (Bechtel et al. 2014). I suggest that the cosmopolitan pathway leads to a different observable implication as cosmopolitanism should increase support for foreign aid more broadly, beyond the individual’s transnational community. I take each of these pathways in turn.

Transnational Ties and Group Interests

Group interests are a long-standing factor thought to shape support for redistribution in the domestic context, yet this factor has until recently been almost completely ignored by the literature on attitudes toward international redistribution. Instead, the literature on foreign aid attitudes has focused almost exclusively on self-interest (Milner and Tingley 2010, 2011; Paxton and Knack 2012) and values, such as cosmopolitanism (Bechtel et al. 2014), ideology (Noël and Thérien 2000), morality (Van Heerde and Hudson 2010), and religiosity (Paxton and Knack 2012). To my knowledge only two studies of international redistribution have considered the influence of cross-border group interests on foreign aid outcomes and attitudes.

First, Bermeo and Leblang (2015) examine how international migration affects foreign aid outcomes. Their study finds a positive association between the number of migrants in donor country B from recipient country A and foreign aid from donor country B to recipient country A. They argue that group interests are one of two important mechanisms leading to this result.² In their theory, diaspora group members mobilize in favor of foreign aid to support those in their cross-border community. They argue that migrant

¹World Bank Press Release, April 11, 2014: “Remittances to developing countries to stay robust this year, despite increased deportations of migrant workers.”

²The other mechanism is donor country interests to prevent additional migration from recipient country A. They find support for this mechanism as well.

voting rights in donor countries should therefore augment the positive relationship between the size of a migrant population and foreign aid toward that population's home country. Their analysis provides some support for this hypothesis. While their work rests on the assumption that individual members of a migrant population support foreign aid directed at their home country, they do not test it. Although one could infer this from their analysis, explicitly testing the validity of this assumption, as I do in this study, provides more evidence in favor of a mobilization mechanism and contributes overall to our understanding of why some countries receive more foreign aid than others.³

Second, the only research to investigate the effect of social groups on the formation of individual preferences about international redistribution is a study by Baker (2015). He examines the role of racial prejudice and racial paternalism in structuring individual support for foreign aid. His research shows that group interests do not structure white American attitudes toward foreign aid as respondents support aid to a black-majority country over aid to a white-majority country. Instead of group interests, respondents' attitudes appear to be driven in part by paternalistic impulses motivated by stereotypes of black foreigners. Despite the mixed findings on the effects of group interests suggested by these two studies, my work takes an important first step in investigating the potential importance of social groups for explaining outcomes and attitudes related to international redistribution.

While there may be a dearth of research on group interests and international redistribution, the literature on group interests and domestic redistribution is vast. It offers numerous studies that demonstrate that group interests can affect redistributive behaviors and outcomes. Experimentally, researchers have shown that individuals are more trusting of and more generous to in-group members. This finding holds for members of ethnic and racial groups, for example, as well as when group membership is artificially simulated in a lab setting (Tajfel 1970; Kramer and Brewer 1984; Brewer and Kramer 1985; Gilens 1999; Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, et al. 2009; Wong 2010). Looking at outcomes, a number of studies have demonstrated that the presence of diverse social groups in a society contributes to lower levels of prosocial activities and policies. For example, in a well-known study on this topic, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) examine differences in welfare state size across developed countries. They argue that differences in the size of the welfare state between the United States and Europe are due in part to the historic diversity of the American population and the homogeneity of European countries. Thus, there is a great deal of evidence that group interests are an important source of incentives for individuals when engaging in redistributive behaviors, but it is unclear the extent to which they structure such behaviors in the international context.

There is reason to believe that group interests might. Scholars have shown that group membership can structure support for other foreign policies such as war and economic sanctions against other countries (Berinsky 2009). Indeed, although Converse (1964) in his seminal work on the nature of mass opinion was pessimistic about the ability of individuals to make reasoned political decisions, he suggested one way publics might do so is by using social groups as reference

points. Building on these insights and the literature on domestic redistribution, I argue that individuals with transnational ties have a cross-border community to use as a reference point when thinking about foreign aid policies. Moreover, they may have a sense of obligation toward the country or region where they have attachments. This feeling of obligation may drive individuals with transnational ties to support redistributive policies that benefit others in these communities (Wong 2010). An implication of this theory then is that transnational ties will increase support for international redistribution but only for foreign aid programs that target foreign community members.

Transnational Ties and Cosmopolitanism

As noted above, the literature on diaspora politics focuses narrowly on diaspora community members' attitudes and behaviors related to policies toward their home countries. This focus has obscured the possibility of a broader range of preferences members of these communities may have. Thus, I propose an additional mechanism linking transnational ties to support for foreign aid. I argue that individuals with transnational ties may be supportive of foreign redistribution regardless of the country receiving aid as transnational ties have been linked to a more cosmopolitan worldview.

Political philosophers characterize cosmopolitanism as a subjective identity in which individuals view themselves as world citizens more than members of a particular group. Other scholars have proposed a less stringent definition of a cosmopolitan worldview in which cosmopolitan individuals are defined as simply having worldly interests. An essay by Jackman and Vavreck (2011) on cosmopolitanism provides a definition drawn from the work of Robert Merton (1957). Cosmopolitans, they suggest, are individuals who are "more attentive to the world than 'locals' who tend to be oriented toward the local community" (Jackman and Vavreck 2011, 71). They show that individuals with worldly concern have distinct political preferences over candidates and domestic policies from those with more parochial interests. Importantly, while there is little work linking cosmopolitanism to foreign aid, Bechtel et al. (2014) demonstrate that cosmopolitanism is one of the key predictors of support for international bailouts in Germany—a form of foreign aid. They define cosmopolitanism similarly and use a measure of cosmopolitanism that builds on Merton's definition.

Although neither cosmopolitanism (as described above) nor transnationalism have distinct and universally accepted definitions or measures (Roudometof 2005), there are compelling reasons to believe that transnational practices like those associated with international migration and maintaining transnational ties can result in a cosmopolitan worldview. Jackman and Vavreck (2011) note that "[t]here is a widely shared scholarly consensus that cosmopolitanism is largely driven by experience" (Jackman and Vavreck 2011, 72). In particular, they argue that cosmopolitanism is a byproduct of transnational practices such as international travel and communication, which lead individuals to interact with others who may be different from themselves. Thus, while it has been assumed in the literature on diaspora politics that individuals with transnational ties are primarily oriented toward their homelands, transnational experiences may actually foster an interest in and an understanding of a broader, more global, range of issues (Mau et al. 2008).

Of particular relevance to this study, Pachon and de la Garza (2000) show that, when Latino leaders are asked about their interest in world regions, around half say they are more interested in Latin America, while the other half

³Moreover, when looking at their results by donor country, Bermeo and Leblang find that the relationship between the size of a migrant population and foreign aid does not hold for the United States. They argue that the reason for this exception is due to the strategic focus of American aid policy. My study suggests an alternative explanation: variation in the strength of transnational ties within the Latino population could affect the willingness of a considerable part of that population to mobilize on behalf of their homeland.

say they are more interested in other regions or are equally interested in Latin America and other regions. The statistics are not broken down by the strength of these leaders' ties with their home countries, but the fact that nearly half of Latino leaders in that study expressed equivalent or greater interests in other regions of the world suggests the possibility that diaspora group members may have a more cosmopolitan worldview than previously assumed. Moreover, [Helbling and Teney \(2015\)](#) argue that the effects of transnational activities on cosmopolitan attitudes are potentially even stronger among the masses than among the elite.

If this argument is correct, then we might expect individuals with transnational ties to have a more cosmopolitan worldview. A cosmopolitan's greater attention to the world and greater empathy toward people of diverse cultures may lead them to develop beliefs about obligations to the foreign poor regardless of their location. Therefore, individuals with transnational ties may be supportive of foreign aid more broadly, rather than supporting only those programs that benefit countries or regions where they have personal connections.

Data and Hypotheses

To investigate the relationship between transnational ties and support for international redistribution, I use individual-level data from a survey fielded in the United States to a national sample of one thousand Latino respondents. The Latino community in the United States is an important population to study for this research question for three key reasons. First, the Latino American community is growing, and the Latino electorate is becoming more influential. Understanding Latino attitudes on foreign policy, which have been relatively understudied to this date, provides insight into the future direction of US foreign policy. Second, Latinos represent a community with important variation in transnational ties, and scholars have argued that this variation is key to understanding the determinants of Latino transnational political behavior and attitudes ([Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003](#)). Finally, while the theory laid out above regarding the relationship between transnational ties and support for international redistribution is rather general, it is likely that it applies most to individuals living in foreign aid donor countries with transnational ties to the developing world. Thus, the Latino American community represents an ideal population with which to begin exploring this relationship.

I use a survey fielded in August 2013 to an online sample of one thousand Latino American respondents. The survey was administered in English using YouGov's online survey platform. It contained a number of questions measuring both demographic characteristics of the respondents and political attitudes. The questions were fielded as a part of the omnibus instrument of the Laboratory for the Study of American Values at Stanford University.

Measuring Transnational Ties

The main independent variable in this study—transnational ties—distinguishes between three mutually exclusive levels of transnational ties using three different measures. These measures are binary indicators for whether or not a respondent was born abroad, sends remittances abroad, or has close friends and family abroad. I code a respondent as having no transnational ties if they meet the following three conditions: (1) they were born in the United States; (2) they do not send remittances; and (3) they do not have any close

friends or family living abroad.⁴ Thirty-nine percent of the Latinos in my sample have no transnational ties.

Among respondents with some transnational ties, I differentiate between those with stronger, more costly ties and those with weaker ties. I code a respondent as having strong transnational ties (about 35 percent of the sample) if they meet either of the following conditions: (1) they were born in a foreign country (first-generation immigrant) or (2) they send remittances. First-generation immigrants are the most likely of any generational group in my sample to have strong connections abroad. More than 80 percent of the first-generation immigrants report having close friends or family abroad and half say they send money abroad to help them. Remittances, however, are a costly form of transnational ties for individuals regardless of generational status (and are themselves a form of private international redistribution). Therefore, respondents who send remittances abroad, but are beyond first-generation immigrants are also coded as having strong ties. Finally, I code a respondent as having weak transnational ties if they meet the following three conditions: (1) they were born in the United States; (2) they do not send remittances; and (3) they have close friends or family living abroad. This category of respondents represents 26 percent of my sample. [Figure 1](#) depicts these coding decisions graphically.

I validate my measure of transnational ties using the self-reported Spanish-speaking ability of respondents—a trait we would also expect to be associated with the strength of transnational ties. I find a significant, nearly uniform, twenty-four percentage point increase across each level of ties in the percentage of respondents reporting that they speak Spanish well. Forty-one percent of respondents with no ties claim to speak Spanish well. Sixty-four percent of respondents with weak ties say they speak Spanish well. Respondents in the strong ties category are the most proficient Spanish speakers with 88 percent noting their high level of Spanish-speaking ability.

The supplementary information includes figures demonstrating the robustness of the key findings to alternative coding rules for the ties measure as well as using Spanish-speaking ability as a proxy for transnational ties.⁵ The results are robust to these alternatives.

Experimental Design

To examine how transnational ties affect support for international redistribution, I construct an experiment that is embedded in the survey. In the experiment, respondents read a fictional news article about a US government program that they are told US officials might cut. The news article contains two independently randomized treatments for a 2×2 factorial design. The first treatment (foreign) varies whether the government program is a foreign assistance program or a domestic assistance program. I use a second treatment (Latino) to test the mechanisms. The Latino

⁴Although respondents who said they do not have any close friends or family abroad were still allowed to answer the question about remittance behavior, only 1 percent of respondents said they sent money abroad when they did not respond affirmatively to the friends or family question.

⁵The alternative coding scheme tested for robustness is a simple additive measure with four levels of ties. The maximum value of this alternative is 3 (being born abroad, sending remittances, and having friends and family abroad) and the minimum value is 0 corresponding to having none of these attributes. Values coded as 2 and 1 correspond to individuals that have any two of the traits or any one of the traits respectively. Individuals who receive a coding of 1 in this scheme primarily report having friends and family abroad but do not send remittances and were not born abroad.




Figure 1. Coding transnational ties

treatment varies the location of the recipients of the aid program. In the news article, the location of the aid program is described as either targeting countries in Africa or countries in Latin America, and a picture associated with the news article reinforces this treatment. Figures 2 and 3 hold the experimental vignette and a screenshot from the YouGov survey platform.

The news article also contains additional information about the program that is held constant across conditions. Respondents read that the program costs the US government \$100 million and provides food packages to 150,000 people living below the poverty line. These constant items are included in order to control for any bias associated with misinformation about how much the program costs and how many people receive help from it. Hunger relief is specified as the type of redistribution as it is typically one of the least controversial types of assistance. At the end of the news article, respondents read that officials hope to make a decision about the program soon. After reading the news article, I ask respondents whether they think the officials should cut the program or should not cut the program. The responses to this question serve as my dependent variable.

While the focus of this article is on support for international redistribution, I include a domestic redistribution condition as previous research suggests that a respondent's degree of acculturation in their host country may affect a number of domestic redistributive preferences. For example, in one study of Latino preferences, Branton (2007, 301) finds that "less acculturated Latinos [measured by generational status] are more likely to support policy positions that distribute benefits to immigrants, the needy, and minority groups in general than when compared to 'fully' acculturated Latinos." Although this finding suggests support for the cosmopolitan mechanism, as respondents with transnational ties are more likely to support aid to domestic minority groups generally, it also indicates that any relationship I discover between transnational ties and support for international redistribution may simply be due to underlying

differences in a taste for redistribution between those with transnational ties and those without. To demonstrate that this effect is not a byproduct of different tastes for redistribution generally across varying levels of transnational ties, I examine support for the domestic assistance program as well. Support for the domestic program should be similar across groups to rule out the redistributive tastes argument.

Hypotheses

I use this data to test three main hypotheses. First, I expect support for the foreign aid program to be strongest among Latinos with transnational ties and weakest among Latinos with no transnational ties (Hypothesis 1). The second and third hypotheses relate to the mechanism behind the effect. I investigate the group interests mechanism using the Latino treatment. If transnational ties are correlated with foreign aid because of group interests, then we should see that the positive correlation between transnational ties and support for international redistribution is driven primarily by respondents in the Latin America condition. That is to say, the relationship between transnational ties and support for international redistribution should be conditional on treatment assignment to the Latin America treatment (Hypothesis 2). If, however, transnational ties also lead to a more cosmopolitan worldview, we should see a strong positive relationship between transnational ties and support for the program targeting foreign recipients in Africa as well (Hypothesis 3). Finding support for Hypothesis 3 does not rule out the group interests mechanism, but it would suggest that cosmopolitanism is an additional mechanism through which transnational ties affect support for foreign aid.

Findings

To test Hypothesis 1, I first examine the distribution of support for the foreign aid program at each level of

U.S. Officials May Cut Hunger Relief Program

Program Gives Food To The Poor In [The United States / Other Countries]

WASHINGTON, D.C. –U.S. government officials are considering cutting a government hunger relief program. It assists 150,000 people living below the poverty line in [the United States / other countries]. Through the program, the U.S. government distributes food packages to program recipients. It costs the U.S. government \$100 million each year. Officials hope to reach a decision about the program soon.



People at program distribution center in [Pennsylvania / New Mexico / Africa / Latin America]. Photo: AGP news

Figure 2. News article with randomizations

U.S. Officials May Cut Government Hunger Relief Program

Program Gives Food To The Poor In Other Countries

WASHINGTON, D.C. - U.S. government officials are considering cutting a government hunger relief program. It assists 150,000 people living below the poverty line in other countries Through the program, the U.S. government distributes food packages to program recipients. It costs the U.S. government \$100 million each year. Officials hope to reach a decision about the program soon.



People at program distribution center in Latin America. Photo: AGP news

Figure 3. YouGov screenshot example

transnational ties. I find 55.1 percent of respondents with no transnational ties supported the foreign aid program (i.e., stated that they did not wish to cut the program), and that percentage increases significantly across each level of transnational ties. Among those with ties, 66.4 percent of respondents with weak ties support the foreign aid program and 74.7 percent of respondents with strong ties support the program. This increase across each level of ties is nearly equivalent and quite strong, with almost a ten percentage point increase moving from no ties to weak and from weak ties to strong.

Because the transnational ties measure is observed, however, and not experimentally manipulated, I also estimate probit regression models of the dependent variable that include a number of covariates to control for demographic characteristics of respondents that could be associated with both transnational ties and support for foreign aid. In these models, aid support is coded 1 if the respondent said not to cut the program and is coded 0 if the respondent said to cut the program.⁶ The ties variable is coded 0 if the

⁶A question that followed the dependent variable asked respondents how strongly they felt about the officials cutting or keeping the program. This question

Table 1. Support for domestic and foreign aid by transnational ties

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>
Foreign	-1.01*** (0.137)	-1.06*** (0.140)
Ties	-0.15* (0.081)	-0.17** (0.083)
Foreign*Ties	0.42*** (0.105)	0.43*** (0.107)
Latino	0.09 (0.088)	0.10 (0.090)
Constant	1.09*** (0.115)	1.14*** (0.260)
Controls	No	Yes
Observations	1,000	1,000
Pseudo R2	0.06	0.10
Log likelihood	-536.69	-515.45

Notes: Statistical significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. The table reports the probit coefficient estimates of the models of *aid support*. The dependent variable is a binary indicator coded 1 if respondents said officials should not cut the aid program and coded 0 if respondents said officials should cut the aid program. The foreign variable captures treatment assignment in which individuals are randomly assigned to read about a domestic aid program (0) or a foreign aid program (1). Latino is a variable that captures treatment assignment in which individuals are randomly assigned to read that the program helps Latinos or people in Latin America (1) or to read that the program helps African-Americans or people in Africa (0). The model with control variables includes age, gender, education, income, employment, race, party, and trust in government and religiosity. Heteroskedastic-consistent robust standard errors are in parentheses. All results are unweighted.

respondent has no ties, 1 if the respondent has weak ties, and 2 if the respondent has strong ties. Aid support is regressed on ties, the foreign treatment, and an interaction term between ties and foreign. In all models with control variables, the control variables include a binary indicator for gender (woman), a continuous variable for age, education (six categories), a binary indicator for household income less than \$30,000, a binary indicator for full-time employment, a binary indicator for republican party affiliation, a binary indicator for race (white), a four-category measure of trust in government (govtrust), and a four-category measure of religiosity.

The results confirm what we see in the raw distribution: respondents with strong transnational ties are significantly more supportive of the foreign aid program than those without transnational ties. Table 1 holds the coefficients from the probit model, and Figure 4 plots the predicted probabilities holding the control variables from Model 2 constant of supporting the aid program at each value of ties for respondents in the domestic and foreign treatment conditions. As can be seen from the figure, there is a significant increase in support for the foreign aid program across the different categories of ties—as the strength of respondents' ties increases so does support for the foreign aid program. While the probability of supporting the foreign aid program among respondents with weak ties is not significantly different from the other two categories, the difference in support between those respondents with strong ties

and those with no ties is statistically significant and substantively quite large. Respondents with strong transnational ties have a significantly higher probability of supporting foreign aid than those with no transnational ties. These results provide support for Hypothesis 1 that transnational ties increase support for international redistribution.

Moreover, as can be seen in Figure 4 there is no significant difference in support for the domestic program across the different categories of ties. If anything, there is a slight decrease in support for the domestic program across the strength of transnational ties as respondents with strong transnational ties are slightly less supportive of the domestic program. These results suggest that the effect of transnational ties on support for international redistribution does not seem to be driven by a difference in redistributive tastes or humanitarianism (discussed more below) across the three categories. Furthermore, these results reflect a pattern identified in other work that shows that individuals who support redistribution in the domestic context do not necessarily support it in the international context.⁷ It is clear from the figure that, across all levels of transnational ties, Latinos have extremely high support for domestic redistribution. Support for the international aid program only reaches the same level of support as the domestic program among individuals with strong ties.

Mechanisms

To investigate the role of group interests (Hypothesis 2) and cosmopolitanism (Hypothesis 3), I restrict the sample to those in the foreign aid condition. I estimate a probit regression model of aid support regressed on the binary indicator for the Latino treatment, ties, and the interaction between Latino and ties. I continue to include control variables to account for any bias associated with underlying demographic traits that are correlated with transnational ties and support for redistribution.

The results of the probit regression model can be found in Table 2, and Figure 5 graphically displays the predicted probabilities from Model 2 at each level of ties for respondents in the Africa and Latin America aid conditions. These results indicate support for the cosmopolitan mechanism, but cannot rule out the group interests mechanism for respondents in the Latin America treatment condition (more on this below). The effect of ties on support for foreign aid is positive and significant, and there is no interaction between ties and the Latino treatment. In other words, respondents' support for foreign aid is not conditional on the location of the aid program. This can be seen clearly in Figure 5.

To further understand the mechanisms behind the relationship between transnational ties and support for foreign aid, I examine the effect of ties on two follow-up questions asked to respondents.⁸ The first question asks if respondents feel that the US government has a moral obligation to help the recipients of the program. If transnational ties cause

⁷ Lauren Prather. 2018. "Values At the Water's Edge: Social Welfare Values and Foreign Aid." Unpublished manuscript, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.

⁸ In addition to this analysis, three other analyses can be found in the supplementary information. First, I examine how Latino group consciousness moderates the effect of transnational ties on support for foreign aid. This analysis addresses the fact that the group interests prime for Latinos in the experiment is their home region rather than home country. Second, I demonstrate using data from the World Values Survey that transnational ties are correlated with identification as a "world citizen." Finally, I provide evidence that self-interest is an unlikely mechanism explaining the association between transnational ties and support for foreign aid.

had four categories and from it an eight-category dependent variable was also created. The results do not change using this measure, and thus the more simple binary dependent variable is used throughout the article.




Figure 4. Predicted probability of supporting domestic and foreign aid across level of ties

individuals to have a more cosmopolitan disposition, then we would expect respondents with strong ties to believe the US government has an equal moral obligation to help the African aid recipients and the Latin American aid recipients. The question appeared as follows:

- **Morality:** Do you agree or disagree that the US government has a moral obligation to assist the recipients of this program? Strongly disagree—Strongly agree (four categories)

I estimate an OLS model of morality regressed on ties, Latino, the interaction of Latino and ties, and the vector of control variables. Results from these models are in [Table 3](#). [Figure 6](#) holds the predicted values of morality from Model 2 at each level of ties for those in the Africa and Latin America aid condition.

I find that the effect of ties on beliefs that the government is morally obligated to assist the recipients of the program is positive and significant at the $p < 0.1$ level. These beliefs do not appear to be conditional on the location of the aid program. There is no significant interaction between ties and the Latino treatment. More concretely, it appears that as the strength of a respondent's transnational ties increases so do their beliefs that the government has a moral duty to help the foreign poor regardless of the recipients' location.

Again, beliefs about obligations could be fueled by group interests or a more cosmopolitan worldview. Thus, I further examine the group interests hypothesis by investigating responses to a second question. This question asks how likely the respondent is to view the foreign aid recipients as members of their in-group. As described in the theory, transnational ties may cause individuals to more strongly identify with a cross-border community, and identifying potential recipients of foreign aid as members of one's in-group will cause respondents to support foreign aid at a higher level. [Wong \(2010\)](#) demonstrates that subjective measures of group identification are strongly correlated with

Table 2. Support for foreign aid by program location and transnational

	Model 1	Model 2
Latino	0.09 (0.169)	0.11 (0.173)
Ties	0.26*** (0.100)	0.23** (0.103)
Latino*Ties	0.03 (0.136)	0.00 (0.139)
Constant	0.09 (0.124)	-0.03 (0.322)
Controls	No	Yes
Observations	507	507
Pseudo R2	0.03	0.07
Log likelihood	-320.05	-307.23

Notes. Statistical significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. The table reports the probit coefficient estimates of the models of aid support. The dependent variable is a binary indicator coded 1 if respondents said officials should not cut the aid program and coded 0 if respondents said officials should cut the aid program. Latino is a variable that captures treatment assignment in which individuals are randomly assigned to read that the program helps people in Latin America (1) or to read that the program helps people in Africa (0). The model with control variables includes age, gender, education, income, employment, race, party, and trust in government and religiosity. Heteroskedastic-consistent robust standard errors are in parentheses. All results are unweighted.

preferences for policies that benefit that subjective in-group. Thus, I measure in-group using the question developed by [Wong \(2010\)](#), which measures the social groups with which individuals identify. The question is as follows.

- **In-Group:** How close do you feel, in terms of your ideas and interests, to the recipients of this program? Not at all close—Very close (four categories)




Figure 5. Predicted probability of supporting aid to Africa and Latin America across level of ties

Latino respondents should on average be more likely to say the Latin American foreign aid respondents are a part of their in-group than the African aid respondents. To test this, I estimate OLS models of in-group regressed on ties and the vector of control variables for both the respondents in the Africa aid treatment group and those in the Latin America treatment group. Results from these models are in Table 4. Comparing the relationship between ties and in-group in the two models reveals that ties is only significantly correlated with in-group among those in the Latin America treatment. Latinos with strong transnational ties are significantly more likely to identify the Latin American aid recipients as part of their in-group than are Latinos with no transnational ties. There is no such relationship in the Africa aid condition. Latinos with strong transnational ties are only slightly more likely to express common interests and ideas with the African aid recipients.

Mediation Analysis

Finally, I employ a nonparametric causal mediation model to estimate the average causal mediation effect (ACME) of transnational ties mediated by in-group identification (Imai, Keele, Tingley et al. 2011). This estimate provides evidence as to whether perceiving aid recipients as members of one’s in-group is the mechanism through which transnational ties affect support for foreign aid to Latin America. There is no need to do this analysis for the sample receiving the Africa aid treatment since the mediator (in-group) can be ruled out given the null result reported in Table 4. In other words, group interests do not explain the positive relationship between transnational ties and support for foreign aid to Africa. As can be seen in Model 1 of Table 5, the ties variable is significantly and positively associated with perceptions of Latin American aid recipients as members of their in-group. Model 2 further shows that respondents with

Table 3. Beliefs about moral obligations by program location and transnational ties

	Model 1	Model 2
Latino	0.03 (0.127)	0.03 (0.125)
Ties	0.20*** (0.076)	0.14* (0.077)
Latino*Ties	-0.04 (0.098)	-0.04 (0.097)
Constant	2.57*** (0.096)	2.14*** (0.228)
Controls	No	Yes
Observations	507	507
R2	0.03	0.07

Notes: Statistical significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. The table reports the OLS coefficient estimates of the models of morality. Morality has four categories taking values 1–4 with higher values corresponding to stronger agreement with the statement that the US government has a moral obligation to help the recipients of the foreign aid program. Latino is a variable that captures treatment assignment in which individuals are randomly assigned to read that the program helps people in Latin America (1) or to read that the program helps people in Africa (0). The model with control variables includes age, gender, education, income, employment, race, party, and trust in government and religiosity. Heteroskedastic-consistent robust standard errors are in parentheses. All results are unweighted.

strong transnational ties are more supportive of foreign aid to Latin America than respondents with weaker or no transnational ties.

As Model 3 shows, when we control for one of the hypothesized mechanisms, in-group, the effect of ties loses significance, whereas in-group is highly correlated with aid support. In other words, people who perceived the Latin




Figure 6. Predicted level of beliefs about moral obligation by ties and aid program location

America aid recipients to be members of their in-group, were significantly more likely to support foreign aid to Latin America. We would expect to see this pattern if in-group mediates the effect of ties on aid support. I next estimate the mediated effect using the nonparametric modeling technique cited above. Model 4 shows that the estimated average causal mediated effect is positive and statistically significant. Moreover, the causal mediation analysis estimates that around 49 percent of the total effect of ties on support for foreign aid to Latin America is due to group identification.

Discussion

The results from these analyses provide evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1: Latino respondents with strong transnational ties are more supportive of foreign aid than respondents without strong transnational ties. Although they are more supportive of foreign aid, Latinos with strong transnational ties do not seem to be more supportive of domestic redistribution as previous research has suggested (Branton 2007). Rather, transnational ties only seem to raise Latino support for the foreign aid program.

Turning to mechanisms, I argue that prior research assumes this effect is driven by group-based interests and propose an additional theory, that the transnational practices associated with international migration and maintaining personal connections abroad could result in a cosmopolitan worldview. I hypothesize that these two mechanisms lead to different observable implications about whether or not the link between transnational ties and support for foreign aid is conditional on the location of the foreign aid recipients. The results presented above provide strong evidence that transnational ties increase support for foreign aid regardless of the location of the aid program. Moreover, respondents with strong ties are more likely to believe the US government has a moral obligation to help the recipients of the aid

Table 4. Identification with foreign aid recipients by program location and transnational ties

	<i>Africa</i>	<i>Latin America</i>
Ties	0.10 (0.078)	0.25*** (0.064)
Constant	1.51*** (0.305)	1.94*** (0.293)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	230	276
R2	0.10	0.14

Notes. Statistical significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. The table reports the OLS coefficient estimates of the models of *in-group*. In-Group has four categories taking values 1–4 with higher values corresponding to stronger feelings of shared identity with the foreign aid recipients. The control variables include age, gender, education, income, employment, race, party, and trust in government and religiosity. Heteroskedastic-consistent robust standard errors are in parentheses. All results are unweighted.

program, regardless of location. I show that group interests do not explain the higher support for aid to Africa among respondents with transnational ties. Instead, I argue that this positive relationship is due to a more cosmopolitan mindset among respondents with strong transnational ties. Finally, while cosmopolitanism is notoriously hard to measure, I provide additional evidence for this mechanism using data from the World Values Survey in the supplementary information. There, I show that Latinos' strength of transnational ties is correlated with a higher likelihood of identifying as a "world citizen."⁹

⁹ A similar mechanism to cosmopolitanism linking transnational ties to higher support for foreign aid could be higher levels of humanitarian concern among those with strong transnational ties. An observable implication of this would be

Table 5. Perception of in-group identification with Latin American aid recipients mediates the effect of ties on support for foreign aid to Latin America

	<i>Model 1</i> (<i>In-group</i>)	<i>Model 2</i> (<i>Aid support</i>)	<i>Model 3</i> (<i>Aid support</i>)	<i>Model 4</i> (<i>ACME</i>)
In-group			0.55*** (0.105)	0.04** (0.02,0.07)
Ties	0.25*** (0.064)	0.26*** (0.099)	0.14 (0.103)	
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	276	276	276	276

Notes: Statistical significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. This table reports the coefficient estimates from an OLS regression model (Model 1) and probit models (Models 2–3) with 95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses. In Model 1, *in-group* is the dependent variable. In Models 2 and 3, *aid support* is the dependent variable. All models include the control variables included in all other models. The nonparametric estimate of the ACME uses Models 1 and 3. Column 4 holds the ACME and the 95 percent quasi-Bayesian confidence interval derived from 1,500 simulations is in parentheses. 49 percent of the total effect of *ties* on *aid support* is mediated by in-group identification. The sample is restricted to respondents in the Latin America treatment condition.

The role of group interests appears to be more complicated. First, as stated above, group interests do not appear to be driving the effect of ties on support for aid among respondents in the African aid condition. However, strength of ties demonstrates a strong, positive correlation with perceptions of in-group identification for respondents in the Latin America aid condition. This is important because, although I did not ask respondents to consider the country where they have ties, respondents with strong ties were still more likely to view the Latin American aid recipients as members of their in-group than those without strong ties. The causal mediation analysis further demonstrates that about half of the effect of transnational ties on support for foreign aid to Latin America is due to in-group identification. I argue that the rest of the effect is due to cosmopolitanism. This is because support for aid to other Latin American countries where Latino respondents do not have ties may also require a more cosmopolitan mindset.¹⁰

Generalizability

While I have made an argument for why I think Latino Americans are the best case with which to test the theory, one might also want to know whether transnational ties have effects beyond the Latino American community. Therefore, I examine the effects of transnational ties on attitudes toward foreign aid among a national sample of Americans

that individuals with strong transnational ties would have higher support for both domestic and international welfare recipients than those with weaker ties. This follows as past research has shown that more humanitarian individuals tend to be more supportive of social welfare programs (Feldman and Steenbergen 2001). Instead, we see that the strength of transnational ties is only significantly associated with support for foreign aid. It is likely that individuals with transnational ties have some level of humanitarian concern, but it is only when they either identify with the recipients or have a cosmopolitan identity that this humanitarian concern is applied to individuals beyond their national border.

¹⁰One might also ask whether individuals with strong transnational ties are more supportive of foreign aid for self-interested reasons. They could want higher levels of foreign aid in order to prevent further migration. As can be seen in the supplementary information, self-interest does not appear to be a mechanism linking transnational ties and support for foreign aid. Instead, individuals with strong transnational ties appear to be more supportive of immigration than individuals with weak transnational ties.

Table 6. Percentage of respondents in each category of ties by social groups

	US White	US Black	US Latino	US Other groups	UK White	UK Nonwhite
Strong ties	10	14	49	25	12	50
Weak ties	23	13	23	24	39	28
No ties	67	73	28	51	49	22
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	937	135	158	59	1,050	119

and a national sample of respondents from the United Kingdom surveyed in 2014.¹¹ Both the US and UK studies feature a similar vignette to the one fielded to the Latino sample. For the national samples, however, respondents are primed to think the recipients of the foreign aid program are of either a white racial background or a black racial background. The race cue in both surveys is only a photo that depicts recipients waiting in a queue. The dependent variable remains the same: respondents are asked whether they think their government should cut or should not cut a foreign aid program. The main independent variable, *ties*, is coded identically. Table 6 reports the percentage of respondents in each category of ties in each national sample by racial and ethnic group.

As can be seen in Table 6, Latinos in the United States and nonwhite respondents in the UK have the highest percentage of respondents with strong transnational ties at around 50 percent of the sample. On the other hand, few white respondents in either the United States or the UK have strong ties. Where these two groups diverge is in the percentage of white respondents with family living abroad. The percentage of white respondents in the UK with family living abroad is around double that of white respondents in the United States. This likely reflects the relative ease with which individuals in the UK generally could move to other countries in the European Union at the time of the survey. Whites in the United States have relatively fewer opportunities to move abroad. Finally, if we look at black respondents in the United States, we see that they are similar to whites in the United States in terms of the percentage of respondents with ties and no ties. Other social groups include Asian-Americans, those of Middle Eastern background, or those who select mixed race or other. These groups are pooled together due to their small sample size, and in general they look more similar to Latinos with around half reporting that they have some sort of ties abroad.

To understand the generalizability of the findings from the Latino survey, we can examine the effect of ties on aid support for each group. Each model replicates the models from the Latino survey using similar control variables and probit regressions. The results from the probit regression models are in Table 7. For the US national sample, the only group for whom ties is positively associated with foreign aid support is Latinos. Among Latinos, there is a difference in the predicted probability of supporting the aid program between those with strong ties and those without ties of about 0.11. Although this effect is not significant at traditional levels due to the small number of Latinos in the nationally representative sample, it is consistent with the effect size from the Latino survey. For whites, blacks, and other social groups, the effect is either null or, in the case of black US respondents, in the negative direction. Although the sample

¹¹In the British sample, there were so few respondents in each nonwhite minority category that I pooled these respondents together in the analysis.

Table 7. The relationship between ties and foreign aid support in US and UK national samples by racial and ethnic groups

	US White	US Black	US Latino	US Other groups	UK White	UK Nonwhite
Ties	-0.01 (0.066)	-0.17 (0.175)	0.16 (0.132)	-0.07 (0.256)	0.11* (0.062)	0.35** (0.161)
Constant	-0.03 (0.223)	0.40 (0.754)	0.89 (0.640)	1.77 (1.274)	-1.04*** (0.185)	-0.73 (0.567)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	936	134	158	59	1,050	119
Pseudo R2	0.08	0.11	0.11	0.29	0.06	0.08
Log likelihood	-593.03	-70.30	-91.29	-28.68	-593.34	-74.11

Notes. The table reports the probit coefficient estimates of the models of *aid support*. The dependent variable is a binary indicator coded 1 if respondents said officials should not cut the aid program and coded 0 if respondents said officials should cut the aid program. American models include the control variables of age, gender, education, income, employment, ideology, and religiosity. British models include the control variables of age, gender, education, employment, ideology, and religiosity. Heteroskedastic-consistent robust standard errors are in parentheses. All results are unweighted.

size for black respondents and respondents of other racial and ethnic groups is quite small, the large sample size of white respondents means that we can investigate the null result further by examining how the race treatment (that primed individuals to think recipients were white or black) might have affected support for the foreign aid program.

When one examines the interaction between the race treatment, ties, and support for foreign aid, an interesting pattern emerges. Although among Latinos, I do not find evidence that group interests play a strong role, there is evidence among white respondents that group interests have a stronger effect. One can see the predicted probability of supporting foreign aid by the race treatment at each level of ties in [Figure 7](#). White respondents with no ties abroad are significantly more likely to support the foreign aid program when primed to think it helps recipients of a black racial background rather than a white racial background.¹² The likelihood of supporting the foreign aid program that helps black recipients decreases significantly across the distribution of ties, while the likelihood of supporting the foreign aid program that helps white recipients increases significantly as the strength of ties increases. These findings make clear that the null effect of ties on foreign aid support may actually be the result of these competing trends and suggests that among white respondents the effect of ties on foreign aid support may be due more to group interests than cosmopolitanism.

Turning to the results in the UK, because the sample is mostly white (around 90 percent) and the size of any one ethnic group in the remaining 10 percent is so small, I simply divide the UK sample into white and nonwhite respondents. As can be seen in [Table 7](#), ties is significantly positively associated with support for foreign aid among both whites and nonwhites. The difference in the probability of supporting foreign aid between white respondents with strong ties and those without ties is around 0.07. Among nonwhites the size of the effect is much larger. The difference in the probability of supporting the aid program between nonwhites with ties and those without is around 0.26. Again, among white respondents in the sample, we can see what part of the difference in the size of the effects is due to the interaction between the measure of ties and the race treatment. [Figure 8](#) holds the predicted probabilities from the interaction. Although there is no longer a negative effect of ties on support for foreign aid

that is targeted toward black recipients, transnational ties do little to increase the likelihood of supporting a program that helps foreign recipients of a black racial background. Instead, the positive association between ties and foreign aid support is entirely due to those in the white recipients condition. The difference in the probability of supporting the foreign aid program among white respondents with strong ties and those without ties is around 0.15 for those in the white recipients condition.¹³

The findings from these national samples add some interesting nuance to the relationship between transnational ties, foreign aid, and the mechanisms that link the two. First, it appears that the findings from the Latino sample are confirmed in a much smaller sample in the United States. Moreover, in the UK sample among nonwhites—a group largely made up of Asian British, Black British, and British respondents from mixed heritage—this finding is also confirmed. There is a strong, positive correlation between the personal connections these individuals have to other countries and support for foreign aid. Second, in contrast to the findings from the Latino sample—that ties increase support for foreign aid regardless of the location of recipients—the location of recipients appears to play a more significant role for white respondents in the United States and UK. While I observe that transnational ties do increase support for foreign aid, this effect appears to be limited to support for recipients in white majority countries. Why might we see a difference between whites and other minority groups in the mechanism behind the finding?

Although I am unable to explain the difference in findings using the data I have here, I can speculate that the reason may have to do with the highly salient racial cleavages in the United States and UK and their relationship to issues of redistribution. Indeed, in his study of group interests and support for war, [Berinsky \(2009\)](#) states that, “[i]t is the political environment that makes groups salient to political decision-making” (130). In the case of the United States and possibly the UK (see e.g., [Soroka, Harell, and Iyengar 2013](#)), the political environment is one in which group interests are highly salient to welfare politics. Studies such as [Baker’s \(2015\)](#) have also demonstrated that, although it may be racial paternalism and not racial animosity that structures support for foreign aid among white Americans, group-based reasoning is nonetheless front of mind

¹² These results are consistent with the findings in [Baker \(2015\)](#).

¹³ For further analysis of the mechanisms behind these effects, see the supplementary information.




Figure 7. Predicted probability of aid support by race of recipient and ties among white respondents in US sample




Figure 8. Predicted probability of aid support by race of recipient and ties among white respondents in UK sample

for the issue of foreign aid. Indeed, my findings add another layer to Baker’s study such that I confirm that the majority of white Americans (those without transnational ties) are more supportive of foreign aid to black recipients than white recipients; however, this effect reverses among white respondents with strong ties to other countries. Thus, not only do studies such as Baker’s need to

account for the factors that shape individuals’ political attitudes toward out-groups, but also those that shape individuals’ attitudes toward in-groups. It may be that on average whites in developed countries such as the United States and UK have few ties abroad and thus may prefer aid to black recipients over aid to white recipients. However, when white respondents have connections abroad, their

preferences for who should benefit from foreign aid appear to align more closely with what benefits their transnational in-group.

Conclusion

This article investigates how transnational ties affect individual support for foreign aid. It proposes and tests two mechanisms behind the effect—group interests and cosmopolitanism. Counter to previous studies that tend to focus on group interests among diaspora members, my study of attitudes toward foreign aid demonstrates that cosmopolitanism is an important mechanism linking transnational ties and support for foreign aid. Transnational ties increase support for foreign aid broadly rather than to only members of a specific cross-border community, although group interests play some role in explaining support for aid to Latin America. Examining the effects of transnational ties among other racial and ethnic groups, however, suggests that the significance of these two causal pathways varies across groups.

These findings encourage future work on this topic. First, future research could examine the relationship between transnational ties and cosmopolitanism directly in addition to investigating the observable implications tested here. Measuring cosmopolitanism is not an easy task as the literature offers a range of definitions and potential operationalizations. However, initial evidence from the World Values Survey included in the supplementary information is promising as it shows a correlation between one measure of cosmopolitanism and transnational ties. Second, while these results provide a starting point for examining the relationship between transnational ties and support for international redistribution, they are limited to studies of Latino respondents in the United States and two national samples. These findings should be replicated using oversamples of other minority groups from other countries to examine how the causal pathways linking ties and support for foreign aid may vary across groups. Finally, future work should examine how transnational ties shape support for other foreign policy attitudes such as trade, war, and immigration.

Although there is more work to be done, these findings alone have implications for how scholars study the impact of globalization and international migration. First, they demonstrate that there is a link between transnational practices and cosmopolitanism. While this link has been examined in a general population (Helbling and Teney 2015), this study encourages scholars to investigate how the transnational practices of immigrants might also lead to a cosmopolitan worldview. Indeed as immigration continues to increase it will be important to understand how transnational connections affect the foreign policy preferences of individuals in these communities.

Second, it is surprising given the importance of the Latino American community that this is one of the first studies to rigorously investigate the foreign policy preferences of Latino Americans. To the extent that these studies exist, they primarily examine the preferences of Latinos for policies that affect their homelands (e.g., Pachon and de la Garza 2000). Importantly, my study investigates the preferences of Latino respondents for policies beyond those that affect their homelands exclusively. This allows me to not only test the group interests mechanism that is assumed in much of the diaspora politics literature but to also discover a broader range of foreign policy attitudes. Indeed, the literature on Latino political behavior in the domestic context has investigated a range of policy preferences beyond just those that are thought to affect the Latino American community. Thus,

it makes sense for scholars to investigate their foreign policy preferences in the same way.

Finally, this article makes a contribution to our understanding of the future direction of foreign policy in the United States. The findings indicate that, as more individuals are able to maintain transnational ties to other countries, we may see an increase in support for foreign aid programs in the United States and a more internationalist foreign policy generally. This is especially important in a country in which foreign aid has historically been among the least supported programs and which has experienced a recent turn toward a more parochial mindset among a large fraction of the American public.

Supplementary Information

Supplementary information is available at the *International Studies Quarterly* data archive.

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